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Abstract 
Theories of blame, mind, and moral attribution consider an individual’s perceived agency, 
operationalized in part as perceived intentionality and self-control. People with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) may display social deficits and a greater tendency to engage in problem behavior 
(PB; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) than neurotypical (NT) people, which may lead 
people to perceive that individuals with ASD act less agentically. Study 1 shows that the 
mitigated perceived agency of people with ASD leads to mitigated blame attribution. In addition 
to perceived agency, theories of mind and moral attribution account for perceptions of an 
individual’s capacity to experience emotions, pleasure, and suffering. Based upon these forms of 
perception, Gray et al.’s (2007) theory of mind perception (TMP) states that minds are perceived 
along the dimensions of agency and experience. Similarly, Gray, Young, and Waytz’s (2012) 
theory of dyadic morality (TDM) states that a person’s moral status is perceived along the 
dimensions of moral agency and patiency. While these dimensional pairs are highly similar, the 
TMP states that its proposed dimensions are independent of each other while the TDM states that 
its proposed dimensions are inversely related. Studies 2 and 3 generated support for the 
prediction that these dimensions are independently related, as proposed by TMP, while the 
inverse relationship posited by the TDM did not receive support.  
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Interconnections between perceptions of blame, mind, and moral abilities 
Blame is a multi-faceted social phenomenon, used to set and affirm norms, and to 
evaluate events and agents (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). As a moral judgment, the 
amount of blame attributed to individuals can have profound effects on their lives –for example, 
higher blame attribution leads to the assignment of more severe punishments (Carlsmith, Darley, 
& Robinson, 2002). As a result, understanding the ways in which people attribute blame to 
others, and ensuring that the appropriate amount of blame is assigned, is integral to ensuring the 
fair and equitable treatment of individuals. Malle et al. (2014) have proposed a Path Model of 
Blame outlining the blame attribution process, and this model provides a thorough consideration 
of the various sub-components that influence blame attribution. Included in this model are 
considerations of an agent’s causality, intentionality, obligation to have acted otherwise 
(hereafter referred to as “obligation”), capacity to have acted otherwise (hereafter referred to as 
“capacity), and reasons for acting. These subcomponents are sequenced in this model, reflecting 
the intuitive process by which individuals assign blame: if an agent is determined to have acted 
intentionally, their reasons for acting are considered; if they were determined to have acted 
unintentionally, their obligation and capacity are considered.   
These judgments are made uniquely with regard to each novel norm-violation. For 
example, when an individual accidentally kills another person, their obligation and capacity are 
judged much differently than if they had accidentally knocked over a lamp. Yet, certain factors 
or identities may exert stable cross-situational effects on components of a path model. For 
example, children are typically assigned less blame for norm violations (e.g., making a hurtful 
comment) than adults. This differential blame attribution arises from a number of differences 
between children and adults. First, it is recognized that an understanding of norms is not innate, 
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and is rather learned by individuals as they develop (Jensen, Vaish, & Schmidt, 2014). 
Furthermore, individuals’ brains, and cognitive capacities, do not finish developing until their 
third decade of life (Gogtay et al., 2004), leading children to possess lower levels of self-control 
(Arain et al., 2013) and foresight (i.e., the ability to consider the long-term consequences of 
actions; Lewis, 1981) than adults. Due to these factors, most individuals would perceive that 
children act less intentionally than adults, and do not have the same obligation or capacity to 
avoid committing norm-violating actions as adults do. This recognition leads to mitigated blame 
attribution, which has in turn been codified into our legal system, such that children are typically 
sentenced much less harshly than adults an identical crime (American Bar Association, 2007). 
An individual’s age is only one factor that may exert such stable effects on blame 
judgments, though, and to ensure the equitable treatment of all people (e.g., in the context of 
criminal sentencing), one must recognize other such factors. One such factor is autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD), the characteristics of which may lead individuals to differentially attribute 
blame to a person with ASD, as compared to a neurotypical (NT) individual, when a norm 
violation was putatively related to ASD. Before addressing this possibility, though, I will further 
explain the path model in order to establish the theoretical framework in which I will be 
working. Then, I will address which aspects of ASD may affect the blame attribution process. 
Finally, I will consider how ASD may also affect the dehumanization process, which also takes 
into account many of the factors that drive the blame attribution process. 
Blame 
 As mentioned, Malle et al.’s (2014) path model of blame provides a unified framework 
that sequences various factors that affect the blame attribution process, and a more robust 
understanding of this model is necessary in order to identify factors that may exert stable effects 
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on blame attribution. According to the path model, the blame attribution process begins when an 
individual detects a norm violation and causally links it to an agent. Once it has been confirmed 
that an agent caused a norm violation, their intentionality is then considered. If the individual is 
perceived to have acted intentionally, their reasons for acting are taken into account. For 
example, if an individual acted for an asocial, vengeful, or selfish reason (Reeder, Kumar, 
Hesson-McInnis & Trafimow, 2002) or if their action predicts further norm violations (Tetlock et 
al., 2007) blame judgments are exacerbated. If an individual acts in self-defense (Finkel, 
Maloney, Valbuena, & Groscup, 1995) or for the greater good (Lewis et al., 2012), blame 
judgments are typically mitigated. In this vein, if a woman shoves a man to the ground in order 
to steal his money and run away (i.e., an asocial and selfish reason), she will be blamed more 
than if she shoved the man to the ground because he was trying to harm her (i.e., she acted in 
self-defense).  
If the agent acted unintentionally, their obligation to have acted otherwise is first 
considered. For example, the higher an individual is in a social hierarchy, the stronger their 
perceived obligation is for preventing negative outcomes (Hamilton, 1986) and the more they are 
blamed for unintentional norm violations (Gibson & Schroeder, 2003). If an agent was not 
perceived to have had an obligation to prevent the norm violation, they are assigned little to no 
blame. Conversely, if they are determined to have had such an obligation, their capacity to have 
prevented the norm violation is considered. This functions such that if the agent had the capacity 
to have prevented the outcome, or possessed the foresight to realize that the negative event 
would occur, they are assigned more blame (e.g., when negligent repairs lead to a car accident, 
the auto-mechanic is blamed; Lagnado & Channon, 2008). Overall, blame mitigation typically 
occurs if an intentional action was committed for acceptable reasons (e.g., a terrorist was killed 
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to save thousands), if the action was unintentional (e.g., an individual accidentally trips another 
person), or an individual had a mitigated capacity and/or obligation to have acted other than how 
they did (e.g., a man is hired to clean out an attic, and throws out a tattered tapestry, not realizing 
that it is a treasured family heirloom). 
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
ASD is characterized by a variety of social deficits, restricted or repetitive behaviors and 
interests, and a sensitivity to change and certain stimuli (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Although the social and behavioral deficits related to ASD map onto the Path Model in 
unique ways (such that people with ASD may be perceived as acting with less capacity and 
intentionality than neurotypical individuals due to these deficits), the extant literature has not yet 
addressed the possibility that ASD may exert stable effects on blame judgments. Although this 
particular link has not yet been explored, blame and punishment are positively correlated 
(Carlsmith et al., 2003), and current behavioral management programs advocate for mitigated 
punishments towards people with ASD (Carr et al., 2002), suggesting that blame attribution may 
also be mitigated. Furthermore, theories of blame and punishment share similar frameworks, 
such that both take into account an actor’s intentionality, capacity, and reasons for acting 
(Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Kane, Joseph, & Tedeschi, 
1977, Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Malle et al., 2014). Consequently, a consideration of how 
these factors drive mitigated punishment may in turn allow one to better hypothesize about how 
these factors may affect blame attribution. 
The literature most often addresses how people with ASD are punished in response to 
displays of problem behavior (PB), a broad term that refers to any disruptive behavior –such as 
self-injury, aggression, or tantrums– exhibited by an individual (Hagopian, 2007). Sixty-four to 
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93% of children with ASD display PB (Kozlowski, Sipes, & Matson, 2012), and numerous 
behavioral interventions have been developed to manage and reduce rates of PB. Positive 
behavioral supports (PBS) are one of the current leading behavioral management programs used 
for individuals with developmental and intellectual disabilities. PBS were developed to minimize 
displays of PB and maximize the quality of life of people with developmental and intellectual 
disabilities, and they have been implemented with success among populations with ASD (Carr et 
al., 2002; Safran & Oswald, 2003). Although PBS can be implemented in any environment, it 
has been most widely used in the public school system as a result of the implementation of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement (IDEA) Act in 2004, which legally 
mandated that schools have systems in place to accommodate the specific needs of individuals 
with disabilities. As a result, the majority of the literature on PBS addresses how it functions in a 
school context. 
PBS explicitly differs from traditional disciplinary responses to PB. Traditional forms of 
discipline used with NT individuals are typically reactionary and centered on negative 
reinforcement (e.g., time-outs for children or speeding tickets for adults). Individuals are 
expected to understand social norms and legal rules, and if one of these rules is broken, an 
appropriate punishment is meted out (Darley & Pittman, 2003). In contrast to this, PBS takes a 
preventative stance, tailoring environments to help individuals to avoid situations in which they 
may commit norm violations. The focus of PBS interventions is “fixing problem behavior 
contexts, not problem behavior” (Carr et al., 2002, p. 8). For example, if a music class is 
completing a unit on percussion instruments, a student with an extreme sensitivity to loud noises 
may be allowed to take periodic sensory breaks during class, or complete an alternative 
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educational activity in a different classroom. In this way, the environment is tailored so PB does 
not have the chance to arise. 
The discipline used by PBS programs can be further considered in relation to two 
predominant theories explaining how individuals punish others: just deserts and deterrence 
theory (Carlsmith et al., 2002). According to just deserts (or retributive) punishment, the 
punishment assigned to an individual should be equivalent in extremity to the norm violation 
committed; according to deterrence theory, the punishment assigned an individual should be 
designed to prevent future similar norm violations. For example, consider a pharmaceutical 
executive who illegally overcharges cancer patients for their treatment and makes millions of 
dollars for himself. If an individual were guided by just deserts motives, they would assign this 
executive a punishment deemed to be equivalent to the monetary and emotional harm he caused 
the victims of his crime. If an individual were guided by deterrence motives, their assigned 
punishment would not necessarily be equivalent to the harm caused, but it would be highly 
publicized, to deter others from committing a similar wrong in the future. 
 Although many individuals cite deterrence as their principal motive when assigning 
punishment, most punishments are in fact informed by a just deserts motive (Carslmith et al., 
2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003). This effect is qualified by the intentionality of the action, 
though, such that while the majority of intentional wrongdoings are responded to with just 
deserts punishment, accidental wrongdoing is responded to with utilitarian, deterrence-oriented 
punishment. Interestingly, the disciplinary framework used by PBS reflects deterrence-oriented 
principles. While PBS primarily advocates for tailoring environments to prevent the display of 
PB in the first place, when PB does arise, deterrence-oriented disciplinary methods are invoked 
(Carr et al., 2002). If an NT student has an outburst during class they would likely be assigned a 
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time-out of equivalent length to the severity of the outburst, reflecting just deserts punishment. If 
a student with a disability in a PBS program were to have an outburst, their punishment would be 
designed to optimally reduce the likelihood of such behavior in the future, reflecting deterrence-
oriented punishment. For example, the student might lose access to a preferred activity (e.g., 
computer time) that will best incentivize them to avoid such outbursts in the future. In this case 
scenario, the severity of the punishment may not be equivalent to the severity of the outburst, but 
it will be designed to best prevent the display of such an outburst in the future. 
Despite the implementation of deterrence-oriented principals in PBS programs, the 
literature addressing PBS is concerned with its practical application, rather than the theories 
driving it. Rather than taking up the philosophical question of whether people with disabilities 
deserve mitigated punishments, or the psychological question of what factors drive these 
mitigated punishments, the literature on PBS is focused on the utilitarian outcome that its 
methods improve the quality of life for both people with disabilities as well as the people around 
them through the reduction of PB (Carr et al., 2002; Safran & Oswald, 2003). Consequently, the 
extant literature has not addressed whether the disciplinary model of PBS is founded on the 
presumption that individuals falling within the scope of the program act less intentionally than 
NT individuals, even though its focus on deterrence-oriented punishment suggests that this may 
be the case (Darley & Pittman, 2003). Relatedly, the literature also has not yet addressed whether 
the mitigated punishments advocated by the program are driven by, or associated with, mitigated 
blame attribution, despite salient links between punishment and blame attribution. A 
consideration of how the aspects of ASD may map onto Malle et al.’s (2014) path model allows 
for a more rigorous theoretical consideration of the possibilities raised here. 
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Behavioral dispositions. ASD may affect the behavioral disposition of individuals in a 
number of ways, such as through the manifestation of restricted and repetitive behaviors (e.g., 
refusing to eat foods of a certain texture) and hypersensitivities to certain stimuli (e.g., refusing 
to wear any type of pant other than sweatpants; American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Wilson 
et al., 2013). Disruptions to schedules or rituals, or exposure to a hyper-sensitized stimulus, may 
lead an individual with ASD to engage in problem behavior. For example, a small, but sudden, 
shift to the daily schedule of a middle school student (such as missing a class for a school-wide 
assembly) could lead the student to display PB. While such behavior would certainly be deemed 
blameworthy if it were engaged in by an NT student (it is expected that students follow the 
school’s instructions), would it be considered equivalently blameworthy when an individual with 
ASD engages in it? 
To begin, one must determine whether this action was intentional or unintentional. Malle 
and Knobe (1997) outline five factors that comprise an intentional action: an agent’s desire, 
belief, intention, awareness, and skill. Desire refers to the agent consciously hoping to attain a 
certain outcome and belief refers to their knowledge of the consequences that are linked to 
executing an action. An agent’s “intention” refers to an agent enacting their desire and belief by 
executing an action to attain a goal. For example, a basketball player may desire to score a free 
throw, believe that if she throws the ball then it will move in the direction that she throws it in, 
and, based upon this knowledge, intend to throw the ball. If the basketball player does indeed 
score a free throw, two final aspects must be taken into account before her intentionality is 
determined: her awareness and skill. Awareness refers to an individual’s self-awareness while 
executing an action while skill refers to their actual ability to accomplish their desired goal. For 
example, if a seventh grade, JV basketball player scores a half-court, buzzer shot, most 
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spectators would discount how intentionally she acted, recognizing that she does not possess the 
skill to accomplish such a feat, and that she rather got lucky.  
Having addressed the five aspects of intentionality, one can now determine whether an 
individual with ASD acts intentionally or unintentionally when displaying PB influenced by 
aspects of ASD. As mentioned, people with ASD have a greater tendency to display PB than NT 
individuals due to deficits stemming from ASD (Kozlowski et al. 2012). In other words, people 
with ASD may have a lower threshold at which they display PB than NT individuals. 
Furthermore, the majority of PB displayed by individuals with ASD has an identifiable, 
immediate cause, as evidenced by the literature’s focus on identifying antecedent and reinforcing 
events, and stimuli that may trigger the display of PB (Matson & Nebel-Schwam, 2007). That is, 
the PB engaged in by people with ASD is not premeditated (e.g., forming a plan to destroy 
someone’s property), but rather arises in the heat of the moment (e.g., tantruming in response to 
a sensitized stimulus). In these cases, the question arises of whether PB was engaged in 
impulsively and with mitigated intentionality, or if it was fully intentional.  
Consider the case of a student with ASD who shoves his teacher after becoming angered 
by a change to his daily schedule. In this case, the student clearly possessed the skill to shove his 
teacher, and understood (i.e., “believed,” to use Malle & Knobe’s (1997) terminology) that by 
thrusting his arms forward his teacher would be pushed back. Presumably, the student was also 
consciously aware of what he was doing and intended to shove the teacher. Lastly, then, one 
must consider the child’s desire. When a person commits a norm violating action, their desire to 
do so must override their self-regulatory capacities. For example, if a young girl is taunted by 
another child, she may be tempted to hit this child, but she does not because she knows that it is 
wrong to hit another person. But if this antagonist continues to taunt her day after day, her desire 
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to hit the child may continue to increase until it overrides her desire not to break the rules, and 
she finally hits the other child. Among individuals with ASD, this component of intentionality 
may be affected, such that individuals with ASD have a higher proclivity towards exhibiting PB 
in response to certain stimuli, and thus the threshold their desire must reach to engage in that 
action is much lower than the threshold of an NT person. According to Malle and Knobe (1997) 
mitigated desire should in turn mitigate perceived intentionality. Furthermore, this proclivity 
towards displaying PB also maps onto the capacity component of the path model, such that it 
reduces the capacity that individuals with ASD have to prevent the display of PB. According to 
Malle et al.’s (2014) path model, if people indeed perceive that a person with ASD acts with less 
intentionality and capacity than an NT person, they should also attribute less blame to the person 
with ASD. 
Social deficits. Social deficits related to ASD can be grouped into two categories: theory 
of mind (ToM) related deficits and general social deficits. With regard to the first category, ToM 
is an individual’s ability to recognize, infer, and make sense of mental states, both their own and 
those of conspecifics (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). ToM perceptions and judgments pervade 
social interactions, affecting everything from the way that people attend to movement (Teufel, 
Fletcher, & Davis, 2010) to how they respond in a socially appropriate manner to others’ 
behaviors (Sigman, Kasari, Kwon, & Yirmiya, 1992). Classically, a false-belief test (in which a 
participant recognizes that another individual may hold an incorrect, subjective belief that is 
different from their own, objectively correct belief) has been used as the gold standard to test for 
ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1985). Although the false-belief test is still used to identify advanced ToM 
abilities, researchers now realize that ToM is not comprised solely of this ability, and a larger 
battery of tests are now administered to assess individuals’ ToM capabilities. While most 
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children pass these tests by age five, children with ASD do not consistently pass ToM tests until 
age 13 (Baron-Cohen, 1985; Happé, 1995; Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2004). 
 As opposed to the narrow conception of ToM originally proposed by Premack and 
Woodruff (1978) and tested by Baron-Cohen (1985), Wellman and Liu (2004) have proposed 
that ToM is composed of five distinct aspects, which are developed chronologically (although, 
interestingly, the last two capacities are achieved in reverse order for individuals with ASD). 
These are an individual’s ability to understand: “a) diverse desires, b) diverse beliefs, c) 
perceptual access to knowledge, d) false belief, and e) hidden emotion” (Peterson, Wellman, & 
Liu, 2005, p. 504). While a dissection of each of these components of ToM is not necessary 
within the scope of this paper, outlining these individual aspects of ToM illustrates its robust 
nature and the variety of ways by which related deficits may lead to norm violations. For 
example, recognizing that others can have desires and beliefs different than our own is necessary 
in order to avoid being perceived as selfish (e.g., when planning a vacation, a person asks for and 
considers the opinions of all of their friends when choosing a destination), and recognizing 
hidden emotion allows us to avoid being socially maladroit (e.g., realizing that a person is upset 
even when they say they are okay). 
Many individuals with ASD are eventually able to pass the gamut of ToM tests (albeit at 
a later age than NT individuals) but several researchers have proposed that they accomplish this 
through the creation of workarounds (i.e., “social algorithms”) that compensate for their inability 
to utilize intrinsic ToM (Baez et al., 2012; Happé, 1995; Peterson et al., 2004). If these 
workarounds fully compensate for ToM deficits, then individuals with ASD would possess the 
equivalent capacity to navigate social situations as NT people, likely also leading to the 
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equivalent attribution of blame for social norm violations. Thus, a further consideration of the 
efficacy of these workarounds is necessary. 
Happé (1995) was one of the first psychologists to propose this workaround hypothesis. 
When studying the age at which children with ASD and NT children pass ToM tasks, he found 
that not only are children with ASD significantly older than NT children when they are able to 
pass equivalent tasks, but that they also possess a significantly higher verbal mental age (VMA) 
–a standardized measure of intelligence– when they pass these tasks. Furthermore, all 
participants with ASD passed both ToM tests administered in the study if they had a VMA of six 
years and nine months or above. Based on these findings, Happé (1995) hypothesized that 
participants with ASD were solving the tasks in a “verbally mediated fashion” (p. 852). That is, 
rather than spontaneously and subconsciously evoking ToM like NT participants, participants 
with ASD were consciously, verbally working through ToM tasks, solving them like a puzzle. 
Sigman et al. (1992) obtained similar results, and formed a similar hypothesis, after finding that 
children with ASD required significantly greater cognitive abilities than their NT counterparts in 
order to pass ToM tests, again suggesting that they may have been creating algorithms that were 
used to interpret social situations.  
Yet, these workarounds may not make up for the lack of intrinsic ToM abilities. Other 
researchers have found that although individuals with ASD may be able to pass ToM tests in a 
laboratory setting, they may still be unable to spontaneously (Senju, 2012) or consistently 
(Scheeren, Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 2013) compensate for ToM abilities in organic social 
settings. Some of the stronger evidence demonstrating disparities between the spontaneous 
activation of ToM comes from experiments using eye-tracking technology. Southgate, Senju, and 
Csibra (2007) had two-year old infants watch a video depicting a false belief task. They found 
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that when the actor returned to collect their object, infants showed anticipatory looking at the 
location the actor had left their object at, even though the infants knew that the object had since 
been moved to a new location. When Senju (2012) replicated this study with adults with ASD, 
they found that they showed significantly less anticipatory looking than an NT control group. 
This supports the hypothesis that although individuals with ASD may be able to pass formal 
ToM tests, this may be accomplished through the creation of workarounds that do not fully 
compensate for ToM deficits in organic, daily situations. 
Moving past ToM deficits, several other researchers have also found that even when 
individuals with ASD pass ToM tests, they still display numerous more general social deficits. 
Klin et al. (2002) found that, while controlling for ToM abilities, individuals with ASD still 
demonstrate a decreased capacity to read facial affect, recognize and make sense of implicit 
social cues (e.g., irony and sarcasm), and read non-verbal social cues (e.g., pointing to an object 
of interest) as compared to NT individuals. Additionally, although empathy is often understood 
to be derivative of ToM, Peterson (2014) found that even when participants passed ToM tests, 
they were still rated as significantly less empathetic than their NT conspecifics. This latter 
finding is of particular relevance, as empathy is understood to play a fundamental role the 
development and maintenance of social norms (Jensen, Vaish, & Schmidt, 2014). Thus, the 
deficits to ToM abilities coupled with the general social deficits displayed by people with ASD 
have the potential to considerably affect the capacity of an individual with ASD to foresee a 
potential social norm violation. If an individual is unable to read another’s affect, observe their 
implicit social cues, or hypothesize about their mental state, they may miss out on important 
contextual cues that guide appropriate social interactions. 
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In sum, the extant literature has identified numerous social deficits, and deficits to ToM, 
that people with ASD may display. Although the latter of these may be counteracted in 
laboratory settings through the development of workarounds, they may still affect a person with 
ASD’s functioning in organic social settings. As with the display of PB, these deficits again map 
onto both the intentionality and capacity components of the path model, such that they may lead 
a person to unintentionally break a social norm or offend another person, and reduce their 
capacity to recognize that what they say or do may be perceived as offensive. If participants 
perceive that individuals with ASD act with less intentionality or capacity than an NT person due 
to the social deficits, and ToM deficits, related to ASD, according to the path model they will in 
turn assign mitigated blame. 
Dehumanization 
 In the same way that blame judgments are influenced by perceptions an individual’s 
cognitive capabilities –to the extent that these capabilities influence portions of the path model, 
such as the agent’s intentionality or capacity– so too is dehumanization. Consequently, current 
theoretical models of blame (Malle et al., 2014) and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006) share 
several theoretical similarities. Dehumanization has been conceptualized in a variety of ways 
throughout the years, but all theories agree that dehumanization occurs when an individual is 
seen as less human than others. Initially, dehumanization was only considered to arise in 
egregious circumstances (Haslam, 2006), such as the treatment of Jews during the Nazi regime. 
But since the turn of the millennium, a number of other, subtler, conceptualizations of the 
phenomenon have been developed, with the aforementioned form of dehumanization now 
recognized as blatant dehumanization (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015).  
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Leyens et al. (2001) first proposed a theory of implicit dehumanization with their concept 
of infrahumanization. They define this as a “process by which people consider their ingroup as 
fully human and outgroups as less human and more animal-like” (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, 
Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007, p. 140). Leyens et al. (2001) propose that infrahumanization occurs in 
the way that individuals attribute emotions to others, and within their theory, they differentiate 
between primary and secondary, or human uniqueness (HU), emotions. Primary emotions can be 
attributed to both humans and animals (for example, a person may describe their pet dog as sad 
or happy) whereas HU emotions can only be attributed to humans (for example, a person would 
not describe their pet dog as disorganized or thorough). According to the theory of 
infrahumanization, an ingroup (e.g., the Spanish) may use HU emotions to describe themselves, 
but only use primary emotions to describe an outgroup (e.g., Catalonians). By humanizing 
themselves through the attribution of HU emotions, the Spanish create a disparity between the 
levels of humanness attributed to themselves (the ingroup) and Catalonians (the outgroup), thus 
implicitly dehumanizing the outgroup. Furthermore, infrahumanization can arise regardless of 
the valence of emotions. HU emotions are simply any emotions that are judged to exclusively 
arise in humans, and they may be either positive (e.g., broad-minded) or negative (e.g., stingy). 
As a result, infrahumanization can arise even in cases of a negative evaluation of the ingroup –
that is, the ingroup could use negative, HU emotions to describe themselves while still using 
primary emotions to describe the outgroup (Haslam & Loughnan, 2013). 
This concept of infrahumanization in turn informed Haslam’s (2006) dual model of 
dehumanization. In this account, Haslam proposes that there are in fact two types of humanness, 
and consequently two types of dehumanization: animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization. 
The former occurs when the aforementioned HU characteristics (e.g., amusement, intelligence, 
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and skepticism) are denied to individuals, reducing the distinction between them and animals 
(e.g., by implying that they possess a lack of morals or self-control). The second form of 
dehumanization occurs when human nature (HN) characteristics (e.g., openness to experience, 
emotionality, and agency), which are understood to be features that are typical of humans, are 
denied to others, which reduces the distinction between them and machines (e.g., by implying 
that they are emotionally cold). Haslam’s (2006) dual model of dehumanization expands on 
Leyens et al.’s (2001) model of infrahumanization in two ways. First, whereas Leyens et al. 
(2001) proposed that infrahumanization arises in regard to HU emotions, Haslam (2006) has 
expanded this to phenomenon to apply to the both emotions and personality characteristics (e.g., 
stinginess, warmth), and second, whereas Leyens et al. (2001) only considered HU emotions, 
Haslam (2006) considers both HU and HN traits. 
While Haslam (2006) is the first to posit a dual model of dehumanization, other 
researchers have proposed parallel models that lend credence to the constructs identified by 
Haslam (2006). First, Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007) identified that mind perception –that is, 
the recognition of another being’s mind– occurs along the dimensions of agency and experience. 
These dimensions map onto Haslam’s (2006) model of dehumanization, such that both the HU 
and agency dimensions account for a person’s ability to act with self-control and forethought, 
and the HN and experience dimensions account for a person’s consciousness and ability to 
experience emotions (Haque & Waytz, 2012). Second, Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2006) identify 
the dimensions of warmth and competence as the two universal dimensions of social cognition 
(i.e., the dimensions along which that we perceive and interact with others), which again map 
onto Haslam’s (2006) model. Both the HU and competence dimensions account for perceptions 
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of a person’s intelligence and skills, while the HN and competence dimensions account for 
perceptions of a person’s ability to act intentionally.  
Although Haslam’s (2006) model is the only to explicitly use its measures to assess 
dehumanization, both Gray et al. (2007) and Fiske et al.’s (2006) models have been used as 
measures of dehumanization. Because the possession of a mind is an essential aspect of what 
makes one human, within the theory of mind perception dehumanization has been 
operationalized as reduced ratings along the dimensions of agency and experience (Cameron, 
Harris, & Payne, 2016). Using a neuroscientific approach within the theory of social cognition, 
Harris and Fiske (2006) found that individuals perceived as low on both the dimensions of 
competence and warmth were dehumanized (operationalized as reduced activity in the medial 
prefrontal cortex, an area linked to social cognition, of participants viewing images of these 
individuals). 
Admittedly, these theories do not overlap perfectly. For example, while Gray et al.’s 
(2007) agency dimension accounts for all aspects of agentic action (e.g., self-control, thought, 
and planning), aspects of agentic action are divided between Haslam’s two dimensions: while the 
HU dimension accounts for self-control, the HN dimension accounts for agency more broadly. 
Nonetheless, these parallel models support Haslam’s (2006) model of dehumanization in two 
ways. First, while each of these theories proposes to measure a unique aspect of social 
perception, they all nonetheless measure social perception along two dimensions. Second, each 
of these theories identifies, in one way or another, that perceptions of a person’s ability to act 
agentically and experience emotions comprise an important part of social perception. Thus, the 
mind perception and social cognition theories lend support to both Haslam’s (2006) hypothesis 
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that dehumanization occurs along two dimensions, as well as to the characteristics that he 
proposes comprise each dimension. 
Having addressed the theoretical underpinnings of Haslam’s (2006) model of 
dehumanization, one can now consider how it relates to Malle et al.’s (2014) path model of 
blame. To begin, these models overlap in the way that they take into account an individual’s 
intentionality and capacity. Haslam’s (2006) HN dimension maps onto Malle et al.’s (2014) 
intentionality component of the path model (such that intentionality is the principal component 
of agentic action; Bandura, 2001), while the HU dimension relates to the capacity component of 
the path model, in that both consider a person’s self-control. Based upon these parallels, the same 
factors that may drive mitigated blame attribution may in turn augment dehumanization. 
According to the path model, lower intentionality and capacity judgments should in turn mitigate 
blame attribution, but according to Haslam’s (2006) model these judgments should also mitigate 
perceived humanness, thus augmenting dehumanization. 
To address these possibilities, Study 1 examined how people perceive the intentionality 
and capacity of an individual with ASD and an NT individual with regard to moral violations, as 
well as how these judgments affected the amount of blame attributed to these individuals and the 
extent to which they were dehumanized. Based on the way that intentionality and capacity 
judgments relate to theories of blame and dehumanization, the following predictions were 
developed. 
1. Participants will perceive less intentionality and capacity in a target with ASD than an 
NT target when a moral violation is related to ASD. Consequently: 
a. The individual with ASD will be blamed less than the NT person, but 
b. The individual with ASD will be dehumanized more than the NT person. 
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Method 
Participants 
 Participants (N = 181) were recruited from Macalester College’s student body and a 
forum called, “SampleSize,” on the website Reddit (www.reddit.com/r/samplesize). Participants 
were not compensated for their time. 
Design 
 This experiment examined how targets with ASD and Type 1 Diabetes (T1D) were 
differentially assigned blame and dehumanized. This resulted in a 2 (target type: ASD or T1D) x 
3 (norm violation type: social norm violation, problem behavior, and non-ASD related norm 
violation) mixed factorial design, in which the former variable was manipulated between-
participants and the latter was manipulated within-participants. The social norm violation and 
problem behavior vignettes were written so that the norm violation in each vignette could be 
plausibly affected by ASD. The unrelated norm violation was included as a control condition, in 
order to assess whether participants uniformly mitigate blame attribution, regardless of whether 
the norm violation is linked to deficits related to ASD. 
Materials  
 This experiment consisted of three principal sections. In the first, all participants read a 
short target description of the protagonist of the vignettes, Tim, which described his interests and 
daily routine. In addition to this description, participants in the ASD description read a short 
description of ASD, outlining the main aspects of the disorder (e.g., “First, individuals with ASD 
may be more dependent on routines, sensitive to change, and have more repetitive behaviors or 
interests than typically developing people… Second, individuals with ASD often have social 
deficits. These are often related to problems with their “theory of mind”, which is our ability to 
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imagine or take someone else’s point of view”) as described in the DSM-V (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). In addition to the description of the protagonist, participants in 
the T1D condition also read a short description of T1D that outlined the main aspects of the 
disease (e.g., Tim also has Type 1 diabetes (T1D), which is an autoimmune disease that he was 
born with. T1D causes the body to destroy the cells that produce insulin, which is a hormone that 
enables people to get energy from food) as described by the World Health Organization (2010; 
Appendix A). 
 The second section contained three moral violation vignettes. The first depicted the 
target committing a social norm violation (i.e., talking about winning a competition to a student 
that lost the same competition), the second depicted him exhibiting problem behavior (i.e., 
becoming aggressive in response to a sudden schedule change), and the third depicted him 
planning and executing a malicious action (i.e., hiding a teammate’s soccer gear in order to get 
more playing time; Appendix B).  
The final section contained a dehumanization questionnaire that asked participants to rate 
the target on 8 different personality traits (Appendix D). Four of these traits were HU 
characteristics (e.g., broad-minded, stingy) and 4 were HN characteristics (active, impatient; 
Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, and Bastian, 2005). The ratings for the personality traits in each of 
these categories were averaged to achieve a mean rating for each type of humanness. An equal 
number of positive (i.e., broad-minded, fun-loving, impatient, thorough) and negative traits (i.e., 
disorganized, shy, active, stingy) were presented. 
Procedure 
Recruited participants followed a hyperlink to Qualtrics, a survey hosting website on 
which the experiment took place. Informed consent was obtained for all participants. Participants 
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were randomly assigned to either the ASD or T1D condition, and read the corresponding 
description of the target. Following this, all participants read all three vignettes (the order of 
presentation was randomized for each participant) and responded to a unique set of three 
questions after reading each (Appendix C). The first two questions following each vignette were 
the same, and they asked the participants how much blame they believed the target deserved, and 
how intentionally they believe he acted. The third question assessed the same overarching 
construct (i.e., the capacity the target had to act otherwise; Malle et al., 2014), although it was 
tailored to the type of norm violation depicted in the corresponding vignette. Specifically, in the 
social norm violation condition, participants were asked whether the target knew that what he 
said would hurt the other students’ feelings. In the problem behavior condition and non-ASD 
related norm violation condition, participants were asked whether the target was in control of his 
behavior. 
After participants completed this section, they completed the dehumanization 
questionnaire as well as several other demographic questions. Following this, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. Throughout the experiment, participants were 
unable to revisit text passages and questionnaires after they had already read or answered them. 
Results 
 Two-hundred and fifty responses were initially recorded, but many participants failed to 
complete significant portions of the survey. Consequently, if participants failed to answer six or 
more questions (i.e., roughly a third of the survey), they were excluded from further analysis. 
This led to the exclusion of 69 participants, leaving 181 participants in the final sample. 
 The personality characteristics on the dehumanization questionnaire were classified as 
representing either the HN or HU dimension of humanness. A Cronbach’s alpha was computed 
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for the characteristics in each of these categories, but neither the characteristics composing the 
HN (α = -.05) or the HU (α = -.11) constructs reached acceptable levels of internal consistency. 
Following this, all eight personality characteristics were aggregated to be used as a composite 
measure of the target’s “humanity,” but this grouping once again failed to achieve internal 
consistency (α = .18) Due to the inability to create an internally consistent measure of 
participants’ perceptions of the target’s humanity, these ratings were excluded from further 
statistical analysis.  
To test the hypothesis that blame, intentionality, and capacity ratings would be lower for 
a target with ASD than for an NT target, independent groups t-tests were conducted. 
Participants’ ratings differed significantly in the expected direction for the two vignettes in 
which the target’s behavior was plausibly influenced by aspects of ASD. In the social norm 
violation vignette (Figure 1), participants in the ASD condition blamed the target less (M = 2.90 
SD = 1.39) than did participants in the T1D condition (M = 4.70, SD = 1.60), t(181)  = -7.97, p < 
.001, d = -1.20. Similarly, perceived intentionality was lower in the ASD condition (M = 1.49, 
SD = .74) than the T1D condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.49, t(181)  = -9.73, p < .001, d = -1.50) as 
was perceived capacity (ASD: M = 1.70, SD = .83; T1D: M = 3.46, SD = 1.47, t(181)  = -9.96, p 
< .001, d = -1.48. This pattern of results was replicated in the problem behavior vignette (Figure 
2). Once again, participants in the ASD condition blamed the target less (M = 3.69 SD, = 1.53) 
than participants in the T1D condition (M = 6.08, SD = .99), t(181)  = -12.75, p < .001, d = -2.21, 
and also perceived less intentionality (ASD: M = 2.96, SD = 1.38; TID: M = 5.39, SD = 1.56), 
t(181)  = -9.62, p < .001, d = -1.43) and less capacity (ASD: M = 2.96, SD = 1.38; T1D: M = 
5.11, SD = 1.77, t(181)  = -8.96, p < .001, d = -1.36). Contrary to the proposed hypothesis, this 
pattern of results was also replicated in the control vignette (Figure 3), in which the target 
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sabotages another player on his soccer team. As in the other two vignettes, participants in the 
ASD condition again blamed the target less (M = 5.58 SD, = 1.50) than participants in the T1D 
condition (M = 5.58, SD = 1.50, t(181) = -7.60, p < .001, d = -1.08), and perceived less 
intentionality (ASD: M = 5.58, SD = 1.50; T1D: M = 6.76, SD = .71, t(181) = -7.06, p < .001, d = 
-1.01) and capacity (ASD: M = 5.06, SD = 1.61; T1D: M = 6.65, SD = .71, t(181) = -8.92, p < 
.001, d = -1.28).  
 In sum, participants perceived that the target with ASD acted with less intentionality and 
capacity, and deserved less blame, than the NT target across all scenarios. To further explore the 
relationship between these variables, and test whether the relationship between condition and 
blame was mediated by perceived intentionality or capacity, bivariate correlations and mediation 
analyses were calculated. 
In the social norm violation vignette, both intentionality (r = .59) and capacity (r = .58) 
were correlated with blame, both ps < .001. The effect of condition was mediated by both 
perceived intentionality [95% CI of indirect effect: .33, 1.16] and capacity [95% CI of indirect 
effect: .31, 1.13]. After accounting for the joint effects of the mediators, the original direct effect 
of condition on blame (t = 7.97, p <.001) was reduced to marginal significance (t = 1.68, p = 
.09). Parallel correlations and mediation analyses were also calculated for participants’ ratings of 
the target in the problem behavior and control vignettes. In the PB vignette, blame was correlated 
with perceived intentionality (r = .58) and capacity (r = .55), both ps < .001. The relationship 
between condition and blame was mediated by the perceived intentionality [95% CI of indirect 
effect: .66, 1.38] and capacity [95% CI of indirect effect: .01, .52]. After accounting for the joint 
effects of these mediators, the original direct effect of condition on blame (t = 12.75, p < .001) 
remained significant but was mitigated (t = 6.42, p < .001). In the control vignette, blame was 
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again correlated with perceived intentionality (r = .47) and capacity (r = .55), both ps < .001. 
Once again, the relationship between condition and blame was mediated by perceived 
intentionality [95% CI of indirect effect: .28, .86] and capacity [95% CI of indirect effect: .16, 
.69]. After accounting for these mediators, the original direct effect of condition on blame 
attribution (t = 7.60, p < .001) was reduced to nonsignificance (t = 1.33, p = .19), indicating that 
this association was fully mediated by perceived intentionality and capacity. 
Discussion 
 In this study, participants attributed less blame to a target with ASD, and perceived that 
he acted with less intentionality and capacity, than an NT target (i.e., the target with T1D) in all 
vignettes. Furthermore, this association between target type and blame was partially mediated by 
perceived intentionality and capacity in the social norm violation and problem behavior 
vignettes, and fully mediated by these factors in the control vignette. These results support the 
first hypothesis: that a target with ASD will receive less blame than an NT target for committing 
an identical norm violation when the norm violation is putatively related to ASD. Unexpectedly, 
this pattern also emerged in the control vignette, in which the target’s norm violation was 
putatively unrelated to aspects of ASD.  
Unfortunately, the HN and HU characteristics adapted from Haslam et al.’s (2006) study 
failed to reach internal consistency, either as independent constructs or when grouped together, 
as a measure of total humanity. As a result, it was not possible to run analyses testing the second 
hypothesis: that participants would dehumanize the target with ASD target more than the NT 
target. The poor observed internal consistency might stem from the design of the dehumanization 
questionnaire, as well as the source from which the characteristics were taken. In Haslam et al.’s 
(2005) study, 32 characteristics were categorized as high or low on dimensions of desirability, 
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human nature, or human uniqueness. To obtain these groupings, the researchers asked 
participants to rate each characteristic on each of these three dimensions, and then conducted t-
tests to determine which characteristics were rated higher on a given dimension than on the other 
two dimensions. Importantly, the authors did not calculate measures of internal consistency for 
the set of characteristics that composed each dimension. This limitation, paired with the fact that 
the current study selected only four traits to comprise each construct (trimmed down from the 16 
characteristic per group provided in Haslam et al.’s (2006) study), likely contributed to our 
failure to obtain internal consistency. Future research may benefit both from the selection of a 
larger number of characteristics to comprise each construct, as well the use of pre-testing to 
ensure that the characteristics comprising each construct reaches a reliable level of internal 
consistency before employing them in a complete study.  
Given that blame and punishment are positively associated (Carlsmith et al., 2002) and 
share similar theoretical frameworks (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Malle et al., 2014), and that 
people with ASD are assigned mitigated, or alternative, punishments (Carr et al., 2002; Safran & 
Oswald, 2003), we hypothesized that blame may likewise be mitigated for individuals with ASD. 
The results of Study 1 show that people with ASD are indeed blamed less than their NT 
counterparts, and that this effect is mediated by perceived intentionality and capacity, consistent 
with Malle et al.’s (2014) path model. 
These results are of further interest in relation to Gray, Young, and Waytz’s (2012) 
theory of dyadic morality (TDM). This theory proposes that morality is perceived along two 
dimensions: moral agency (i.e., a person ‘s capacity to execute moral actions) and moral patiency 
(i.e., a person’s capacity to experience moral actions). While every moral situation is comprised 
of a moral agent and a moral patient who are different from each other, each person’s general 
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moral status is perceived along both of these dimensions simultaneously. When a person’s moral 
status is considered, Gray et al.’ (2012) propose that these dimensions are inversely related; the 
higher a person is perceived along one dimension (e.g., moral agency) the lower they are 
perceived along the other (e.g., moral patiency), such that people are “morally typecast” into one 
role or another (Gray & Wegner, 2009). For example, Gray and Wegner (2009) found that 
superheroes are typecast as moral agents, and are consequently rated as low in moral patiency, 
whereas civilians are not typecast as either role, and are thus perceived along these dimensions in 
equal measure. In this way, while both a superhero and a civilian occupy the role of a moral 
patient if they are tortured, participants perceive that a superhero feels less pain than a civilian; 
that is, participants perceive the superhero as less of a moral patient than the civilian due to the 
superhero being typecast as a moral agent. 
In Study 1, a target with ASD, as compared to an NT target, was perceived to act with 
less intentionality and capacity, and consequently to deserve less blame. Blame and praise are 
used as measures of a target’s moral agency; thus, these results suggest that the target with ASD 
was perceived as a lesser moral agent. According to Gray et al.’s (2012) TDM, these reduced 
perceptions of moral agency should correspondingly augment perceptions of moral patiency, due 
to the inverse relationship between these dimensions. That is, the target with ASD should be 
typecast as a moral patient. Extant literature analyzing Anglophone media representation of 
people with ASD offers preliminary support for this hypothesis. In their review of British 
newspapers from 1999-2008, Huws and Jones (2010) found that people with ASD were most 
often described as “victims” of their disorder, or as “suffering.” These descriptions portray 
people with ASD as possessing low levels of moral agency (victimization assigns agency to the 
disorder rather than the individual) and augmented levels of moral patiency (moral patiency is 
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operationalized as suffering). This pattern of representation also emerged in a review of 
Australian newspaper articles that addressed portrayals of autism spectrum disorders (Jones & 
Harwood, 2008). The authors found that people with ASD were often described as maltreated 
and neglected, thus again typecasting them as moral patients. Interestingly, these authors also 
observed conflicting forms of representation, such that people with ASD were also portrayed as 
violent, uncontrollable, and a burden to their friends and family, traits which are linked to moral 
agency. Even in this case, individuals with ASD may still be portrayed as moral patients, as ASD 
is presented as the cause of their actions (e.g., aggression), and the individuals themselves as 
subject to the control of this disorder. 
Gray et al.’s (2012) TDM predicts that the mitigated perceived moral agency of people 
with ASD in Study 1 should typecast them as moral patients, and thus augment perceptions of 
their moral patiency. Further supporting this hypothesis, reviews of Anglophone print media 
provide initial evidence that people with ASD may indeed be typecast as moral patients (Huws & 
Jones, 2010; Jones & Harwood, 2008). Study 2 sought to experimentally ascertain whether 
people with ASD are indeed typecast as moral patients. 
Study 2  
 Gray et al.’s (2012) TDM propose that “mind perception is the essence of morality” (p. 
103), and consequently base their dimensions of moral agency and patiency respectively off of 
the dimensions of agency and experience proposed in Gray et al.’s (2007) theory of mind 
perception (TMP). According to the TMP (Gray et al., 2007), we perceive others’ minds along 
the dimension of agency (i.e., their capacity to plan, hold goals, and act intentionally) and 
experience (i.e., their ability to experience emotions, pleasure, and suffering), which are similar 
to Gray et al.’s (2012) dimensions of moral agency and patiency. Beyond the similarity in their 
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theoretical claims, these two theories are also similar with respect to the measures used to assess 
them. On Gray et al.’s (2007) Mind Scale questionnaire (which includes agency and experience 
subscales) participants rate a target’s ability to experience pain and pleasure, both of which are 
also used as measures of a target’s moral patiency. While agency and moral agency are not 
assessed with identical items, they nonetheless have substantial overlap. The TDM 
operationalizes moral agency as a target’s ability to incur blame and praise, while the TMP 
operationalizes agency as a target’s ability to plan and exert self-control–two traits that partially 
mediated blame attribution in Study 1. While these theories purport to measure different aspects 
of an individual (i.e., either their mind or their moral status), the theoretical and operational 
similarities between them invites an investigation of whether they differ substantively from one 
another. 
The most notable difference between these theories is their conceptualization of the 
relationship between their respective dimensions. The TDM posits that moral agency and 
patiency are inversely related to one another, such that the greater an individual is perceived 
along one dimension, the lesser they are perceived along the other. In contrast to this, the TMP 
posits that these dimensions are independent of one another; that is, an individual’s rating along 
one dimension does not affect their rating along the other. Thus, if an individual receives 
elevated agency or moral agency ratings, according to the TDM this will lead to mitigated 
experience or moral patiency ratings, while according to the TMP this will have no effect on 
experience or moral patiency ratings. This apparent conflict has even been noted by Gray and 
Wegner (2009), whose experimental work on moral typecasting demonstrated the inverse 
relationship between moral agency and patiency posited by the TDM. These authors propose that 
this conflict is not indicative of a fundamental disagreement between these theories, but rather 
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that experience and agency can relate to each other along two broader dimensions: a mind 
perception dimension (where agency and experience are independent) and a moral perception 
dimension (where moral agency and patiency are inversely related). 
Indeed, experimental evidence supports both the conceptualization of agency and 
experience constituting a mind and experience versus agency constituting an individual’s moral 
status. In support of their TMP, Gray et al. (2007) identified agents whose ratings along the 
dimensions of agency and experience demonstrate every possible relationship between these two 
dimensions. For example, an average human man and woman are rated high on both agency and 
experience; God is rated high on agency but low on experience; a baby is rated low on agency 
and high on experience; and a dead man is rated low on both agency and experience. In support 
of their TDM, Gray and Wegner (2009) conducted several studies that consistently found that an 
agent’s moral agency and patiency ratings are inversely related. For example, a child is typecast 
as a moral patient and consequently receives elevated moral patiency ratings and mitigated moral 
agency ratings; conversely, a superhero is typecast as a moral agent and subsequently receives 
elevated moral agency ratings and mitigated moral patiency ratings. Furthermore, these authors 
found that if a neutral target (e.g., an average man) acts as a moral agent or patient in one 
vignette, he will be typecast as such in future vignettes. Thus, one must ask how the dimensions 
of agency and experience, and moral agency and patiency, can be theoretically and operationally 
similar, yet receive experimental support for the competing claims that they are independent of 
one another and inversely related to each other? 
 Importantly, the TDM and TMP appear to differ regarding the context in which they 
consider an agent. The experimental evidence demonstrating the inverse relationship between the 
dimensions of moral agency and patiency (Gray & Wegner, 2009), proposed by the TDM, has 
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been collected with regard to specific moral situations. For example, Gray and Wegner (2009) 
asked participants to read about a person killing a man, and then rate him along the dimensions 
of moral agency and patiency. In this case, the man was perceived as high in moral agency and 
low in moral patiency, which the authors take as evidence that he was morally typecast as a 
moral agent based upon his behavior in the vignette. In contrast to this, the experimental 
evidence demonstrating that the dimensions of agency and experience are independent of one 
another, as proposed by the TMP (Gray et al., 2007), has been collected with regard to an agent’s 
general traits. In Gray et al.’s (2007) study, participants read brief descriptions of a target (e.g., 
that the target had been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for the past six months or that the 
target was a middle-aged woman who works at an advertising agency) and then rated them along 
the items on the Mind Scale; participants did not consider any specific behaviors that the agent 
performed. In this way, it appears that while the TDM and TMP use identical dimensions, albeit 
with nominal differences (i.e., agency or moral agency, and experience or moral patiency), these 
dimensions relate differently depending on the context in which they are considered. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that when a target is considered in a general context, the dimensions 
accounting for agency and experience are independent of one another (in line with the TMP), 
while if an agent is considered in a specific context, these dimensions are inversely related to one 
another (in line with the TDM). This prediction will hereafter be referred to as the context 
hypothesis. 
This context hypothesis reconciles the competing predictions generated by the TMP and 
TDM concerning how an individual with ASD will be perceived along the dimensions of agency 
and experience, and moral agency and patiency. To understand how this functions, one can first 
consider the predictions generated by each theory, and then consider how these predictions may 
PERCEPTIONS OF BLAME, MIND, AND MORAL ABILITIES 
 
33 
be moderated by context. As mentioned, the dimensions of agency and experience proposed by 
the TMP have been used as a measure of dehumanization (Cameron et al., 2016), such that lower 
ratings on each of these dimensions indicates reduced overall mind perception and thus 
dehumanization. ASD is a stigmatized disorder (Obeid et al., 2015) and stigma has been 
identified as a factor that leads to dehumanization (Cameron et al., 2016). Thus, in line with the 
TMP, one predicts that the stigma related to ASD will lead to a target with ASD being 
dehumanized, operationalized as the receipt of lower ratings along the agency and experience 
dimensions. The TDM posits that the dimensions of moral agency and patiency are inversely 
related. Thus, based on the finding that a target with ASD was perceived as less of a moral agent 
than an NT target in Study 1 (operationalized as lower ratings of blame and intentionality), the 
TMD predicts that the target with ASD will consequently be perceived as a greater moral patient 
(operationalized as his increased capacity to experience suffering or pleasure). 
According to the context hypothesis, the competing predictions proposed by the TDM 
and TMP can be reconciled by considering the different contexts in which the target is 
considered by participants. Specifically, the way that the dimensions of agency and experience, 
and moral agency and patiency, relate to each other can be predicted by the TMP in the general 
context condition, and by the TDM in the specific context condition. Thus, one predicts that if a 
target with ASD is considered in a general context he will receive mitigated agency and moral 
agency, and experience and patiency, ratings (hereafter referred to for this study as the general 
prediction). One also predicts that if he is considered in a specific context he will receive 
mitigated agency and moral agency ratings, but elevated experience and moral patiency ratings, 
(hereafter referred to for this study as the specific prediction). 
Method 
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Participants 
 Participants (N = 640) were recruited for $.30 on MTurk, a marketplace run by Amazon 
on which individuals can complete surveys or other tasks for monetary compensation 
Design 
 This experiment examined how participants assigned blame, and perceived the agency 
and experience, and moral agency and patiency, of a target with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
or type 1 diabetes (T1D), based upon their knowledge of either only a general description of the 
target, or also their additional knowledge that the target executed a moral action. This resulted in 
a 2 (target type: ASD or T1D) x 2 (context: general or specific) x 2 (perception type: mind or 
moral) between subjects design.  
Materials  
 The target descriptions (ASD and T1D) were identical to those used in Study 1 
(Appendix A). The moral violation vignettes (social norm and control) likewise were identical to 
those used in Study 1 (Appendix B). The Mind Scale questionnaire (Gray et al., 2007; Appendix 
E) consisted of items assessing the extent to which the target possessed a number of mental traits 
along the dimensions of agency (self-control, morality, emotion recognition, memory, planning, 
communication, thought) and experience (hunger, fear, pain, pleasure, rage, desire, personality, 
consciousness, pride, embarrassment, and joy). Finally, five moral perception items assessed the 
target’s moral agency (capability to deserve blame or praise for his actions) and moral patiency 
(capability to experience suffering or pleasure; Appendix F). 
Procedure 
Recruited participants followed a hyperlink to Qualtrics, a survey hosting website on 
which the experiment took place. Informed consent was obtained for all participants. Participants 
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were randomly assigned to either the ASD or T1D condition, and then read the corresponding 
description of the target.  
Participants were then randomly assigned to either the general or specific context 
condition, as well as to the mind perception or moral perception condition. After reading the 
target description, participants in the specific context condition were randomly assigned to read 
one of the two moral agency vignettes. Then they provided ratings about the target, completing 
either the mind perception items (Mind Scale survey: Gray et al., 2007) or the moral perception 
items, depending on their randomly assigned condition. Participants in the general context 
condition did not read about a specific behavior; they provided target ratings (mind perception or 
moral perception) immediately after reading the target description. 
Upon their completion of their respective questionnaires participants were debriefed and 
dismissed. Throughout the experiment, participants were unable to revisit text passages and 
questionnaires after they had already read or answered them. 
Results 
Reliability analyses were run for the items used in the Mind Scale (Gray et al., 2007) and 
the Moral Perception questionnaire. The items comprising the agency dimension of the Mind 
Scale had excellent internal consistency (α = .84), as did the items comprising the experience 
dimension (α = .87); consequently, the items comprising these dimensions were averaged to form 
agency and experience scores. The items comprising the agency subscale of the Moral 
Perception questionnaire (moral responsibility, blame, and praise) demonstrated poor internal 
consistency (α = .31), which was due to poor cohesion between praise ratings and the other two 
variables. Blame and moral responsibility ratings were strongly correlated (r = .68, p < .001), as 
were the items assessing perceived moral patiency (capacity for suffering and pleasure; r = .75, p 
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<.001). Thus, blame and moral responsibility ratings were averaged to form a moral agency 
score, and capacity for suffering and pleasure ratings were averaged to form a moral patiency 
score. 
 First, we tested the general context hypothesis—namely, that when reading only a general 
description of the target, participants would view the target with ASD as lower in agency and 
experience (and, similarly, as lower in moral agency and patiency) than the NT target. In support 
of this hypothesis, in the general context condition the target with ASD received lower agency 
ratings (M = 3.00, SD = .63) than the NT target (M = 3.81, SD = .72), t(159) = -7.59, p < .001, d 
= -1.20. Experience ratings, however, did not differ by target (ASD: M = 3.37, SD = .75; NT: M 
= 3.45, SD = .68) t(159) = -.68, p = .50, d = -.11 Revealing a parallel pattern, the target with 
ASD was seen as less of a moral agent (M = 3.52, SD = .95) than the NT target (M = 3.98, SD = 
.97, t(161) = -3.04, p = .003, d = -.48), but moral patiency ratings did not differ by target type 
(ASD: M = 4.12, SD = .92; NT: M = 4.09, SD = 1.27), t(161) = .15, p = .88, d = .03 (Figure 4). 
 Then, we tested our specific context prediction—namely that when reading about a 
target’s specific moral violation, participants would view the target with ASD as lower in moral 
agency but higher in patiency (and, similarly, as lower in agency but higher in experience) than 
an NT target. Restricting the analysis to the specific context condition, the target with ASD was 
indeed seen as lower in moral agency (M = 4.02, SD = 1.45) than the NT target (M = 4.56, SD = 
1.14, t(161) = -2.66, p = .01, d = -.41), but moral patiency ratings did not differ by target type 
(ASD: M = 3.90, SD = 1.55; NT: M = 3.86, SD = 1.23), t(161) = .18, p = .86, d = .03. Neither 
ratings of agency (ASD: M = 2.83, SD = .71; NT: M = 2.79, SD = .67) nor ratings of experience 
(ASD: M = 3.10, SD = .70; NT: M = 2.95, SD = .72) differed by target type, ts(159) < 1.30, ps > 
.10, ds < .3 (Figure 5).  
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 To test these ratings across context condition, factorial ANOVAs were run predicting 
agency, experience, moral agency, and patiency scores by target type, context type, and a target x 
context type interaction. A target x context type interaction was not observed for experience, 
moral agency, or patiency scores (all Fs(327) <  2, ps > .15), but this interaction was observed 
for agency scores, F(327) = 31.44, p < .001). While the NT target received significantly higher 
agency scores in the general context (M = 3.81, SD = .73) than the target with ASD (M = 3.00, 
SD = .63, t(159) = 7.59, p < .001, d = 1.19), their agency ratings did not differ in the specific 
context (NT: M = 2.79, SD = .71; ASD: M = 2.83, SD = .67), t(159) = -.41, p = .68, d = -.06. 
 To test whether context moderated the relationship between agency and experience (or 
between moral agency and patiency), as proposed by the context hypothesis, generalized linear 
models were created. For the Mind Scale, agency ratings were regressed on experience ratings 
and the experience x context interaction. Experience ratings strongly predicted agency ratings (β 
= .73, p < .001), but the experience x context interaction was not a significant predictor (β = .01, 
p = .90). Thus, context did not moderate the relationship between agency and experience ratings. 
For the Moral Perception questionnaire, moral agency ratings were regressed on moral patiency 
ratings and the moral patiency x context interaction. Here, moral patiency ratings did not predict 
moral agency ratings (β = .18, p = .83), but there was a significant moral patiency x context 
interaction (β =.25, p = .025), indicating that these scores related differently to each other 
depending on context condition. In the general context, moral agency and patiency ratings were 
more strongly correlated (r = .48, p < .001) than in the specific context (r = .20, p < .001). 
Discussion 
According to the context hypothesis, we predicted that the relationship between perceived 
agency and experience would mirror that between perceived moral agency and moral patiency, 
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across each context condition (either general or specific) in this study. Our general context 
prediction stated that the target with ASD would be assigned lower agency and moral agency, 
and experience and patiency, ratings in the general context (thus indicating dehumanization). Our 
specific context prediction stated that the target would receive lower agency and moral agency, 
but elevated experience and patiency, ratings in the specific context. Each of these predictions 
received partial support.  
In the general context condition, the target with ASD was assigned lower agency and 
moral agency ratings than the NT target but the experience and patiency ratings for the two 
targets did not differ significantly, thus only partially confirming our general context prediction. 
Nonetheless, agency and moral agency, and experience and patiency, ratings mirrored each 
other, as predicted by the context hypothesis. In the specific context condition, the target with 
ASD received lower moral agency ratings than the NT target, supporting our specific context 
prediction, although agency, experience, and patiency ratings did not differ by target as 
predicted. While experience and patiency ratings mirrored each other in this context as predicted 
by the context hypothesis, agency and moral agency ratings did not. Finally, a patiency x context 
interaction predicted moral agency scores, such that moral agency and patiency scores were more 
strongly correlated in the general context than the specific context. Although the prediction that 
these scores would be positively correlated in the general context and inversely correlated in the 
specific context was not confirmed, the observed correlations nonetheless differed in the 
expected direction (such that agency and experience scores demonstrated a stronger positive 
correlation than moral agency and patiency scores). In sum, these results generate only partial 
support for the context hypothesis. While the relationship between moral agency and patiency 
ratings mirrored that between agency and experience ratings in the general context, this pattern 
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was not observed in the specific context. Additionally, while context moderated the relationship 
between moral agency and patiency scores, it did not moderate the relationship between agency 
and experience scores. 
When our hypotheses were unconfirmed it was due to a lack of a significant difference 
between scores by target type, rather than differences arising opposite of the predicted direction. 
Consequently, while the failure to observe significant differences may indeed be due to fault 
with the hypotheses themselves, it may also be due to a lack of statistical power. Specifically, the 
difference between the two targets may not have been significant enough to reveal differences in 
their ratings along each dimension. The experimental evidence supporting the TMP (Gray et al., 
2007) and TDM (Gray & Wegner, 2009) used a diverse range of targets intended to test the 
extremes of each theory. For example, in Gray and Wegner’s (2009) studies on moral 
typecasting they asked participants to consider two targets with extreme, salient differences. In 
one study, participants rated individuals famous for either good or bad moral actions (e.g., 
Mother Theresa or Ted Bundy, both typecast as moral agents) and normal citizens; in another 
they rated young children (typecast as moral patients) and adults.   
While developing their theory of mind perception, Gray et al. (2007) collected 
information on a variety of agents, not even all of whom were human (e.g., a dead man, a dog, 
and God), who represented the extremes of the agency and experience ratings that one can 
receive (e.g., a dead man is rated low on agency and experience, a dog is rated low on agency 
and high on experience, God is rated high on agency and low on experience). Within normally 
functioning human targets, there was significantly less diversity in agency and experience 
ratings. In fact, all human targets with normal cognitive functioning (i.e., a child and two adults) 
received near maximum experience ratings, with only their agency ratings differing. In the 
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present study, participants rated one of two middle school students who had the same interests 
and hobbies. The only difference between them was that one had ASD while the other had T1D. 
Furthermore, the description of ASD saliently implicated the target’s ability to act agentically 
(e.g., “[people with ASD] sometimes display aggressive or destructive behaviors when they 
become angry” and “as a result of these deficits, individuals with ASD may make social faux pas 
or say something offensive to others”; Appendix A) while it addressed traits related to 
experience/patiency to a much lesser extent. Relatedly, the most consistent differences found 
between the targets pertained to their agency and moral agency scores: the target with ASD 
received lower agency and moral agency scores in the general context, and lower moral agency 
scores in the specific context. The targets’ experience and moral patiency scores did not differ in 
either context. In this way, these two targets may have been too similar to expose differences 
regarding their perceived experience and patiency (as predicted by the TMP and TDM) even if 
these differences indeed exist. 
 Another potential limitation of this study pertains to the prediction that the target with 
ASD would receive lower agency and experience ratings (and moral agency and patiency 
ratings) if considered in a general context. This prediction was based upon the fact that ASD is a 
stigmatized disorder (Obeid et al., 2015) and stigma is linked to dehumanization (Cameron et al., 
2016) –operationalized as reduced agency and experience ratings on the Mind Scale. The stigma 
associated with ASD may not have been strong enough to lead to dehumanization, though. In 
Cameron et al.’s (2016) study, they only observed this relationship between stigma and 
dehumanization when asking participants to consider helping a homeless drug addict (a highly 
stigmatized social category). Notably, when the researchers asked participants to simply read 
about (rather than consider helping) this target, or to consider helping a less stigmatized target 
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(i.e., an individual who is homeless due to the cost of treatment for a medical condition), the link 
between stigma and dehumanization was not present. In contrast to this, participants in the 
present study were simply asked to read about a target that has ASD, the stigma associated with 
which is much less than that associated with homelessness or drug addiction. Thus, perhaps the 
stigma associated with ASD was not strong enough or salient enough to lead to the 
dehumanization of a person with ASD.  
 This explanation is further supported by a consideration of stigma and dehumanization 
with regard to Fiske et al.’s (2006) model of social cognition. This model proposes that we 
perceive others along the dimensions of competence and warmth, which line up respectively with 
the dimensions of agency and experience (and moral agency and patiency). Harris and Fiske 
(2006) found that only people who are identified as low on both competence and warmth are 
dehumanized. Furthermore, Harris and Fiske (2006) note that while drug addicts are classified as 
low on both of these dimensions –thus corroborating Cameron et al.’s (2016) finding that a 
homeless drug addict is dehumanized– “disabled people” are rated low on competence but high 
on warmth. If one translates these ratings to the respective dimensions used by the TMP and 
TDM, a “disabled person” (e.g., a person with ASD) would be rated low on agency and moral 
agency, but high on experience and patiency. Thus, while ASD is indeed a stigmatized disorder, 
it may only affect perceptions of a person’s agency, leaving perceptions of their experience 
unaffected, explaining our failure to observe differences in the experience and patiency ratings 
assigned to targets in the general context condition of this study. 
Study 3 
 The failure to obtain full support for our hypotheses (i.e., the context hypothesis, general 
context prediction, and specific context prediction) in Study 2 appeared to be due in part to the 
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insufficient strength of our experimental manipulation. To maximize the strength of our 
manipulations, and to improve our fidelity to the methodology of the studies that first generated 
evidence for the TMP and TDM, we drew more directly off of the design of these original 
studies. Specifically, we used an adult woman and a young girl as our targets (originally used by 
Gray et al., 2007) and we had participants read two vignettes either taken from, or based off of, 
Gray and Wegner’s (2009) moral typecasting studies. These changes generated several new 
predictions. Based upon the agency and experience ratings assigned to a child and woman in 
Gray et al.’s (2007) study, one predicts that the child will receive lower agency ratings than the 
woman in the general context condition, but that their experience scores will not differ (hereafter 
referred to for this study as the general context prediction). The TDM generates two predictions 
concerning typecasting in the specific context condition (hereafter referred to for this study as the 
specific context prediction). First, in line with Grey and Wegner’s (2009) findings, the child 
should be typecast as a moral patient, thus receiving lower moral agency ratings, but higher 
moral patiency ratings, than the woman. Second, if participants first read about a target acting as 
a moral agent, they should typecast her as such, and likewise if they first read about a target as 
moral patient. Finally, the context hypothesis predicts that the relationship between agency and 
experience ratings will mirror the relationship between moral agency and patiency ratings within 
each context condition. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants (N = 720) were recruited for $0.40 on MTurk. 
Design 
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This experiment examined how participants assigned blame, and perceived the agency 
and experience, and moral agency and patiency, of a young girl and an adult woman, based upon 
their knowledge of either only a general description of the target, or also their additional 
knowledge that the target executed and experienced moral actions. This resulted in a 2 (target 
type: child or adult) x 2 (perception type: mind or moral) x 2 (order: moral agency first or moral 
patiency first) between subjects design. A single general context condition was also included, in 
which participants completed all of the above conditions as a within-subjects design. 
Materials 
 The target descriptions were taken from Gray et al.’s (2007) study on mind perception  
(“Sharon Harvey, 38, works at an advertising agency in Chicago” and “Samantha is a five-year-
old girl who lives with her parent and older sister Jennifer”). The first moral violation vignette 
was taken from Gray and Wegner’s (2009) paper proposing the moral typecasting hypothesis, 
while the second vignette was developed specifically for this experiment (Appendix G). The 
Mind Scale questionnaire (Gray et al., 2007; Appendix E), first used in Study 2, was again used. 
Similarly, the moral perception questions (Appendix H) were also adapted from Gray and 
Wegner’s (2009) study. 
Procedure 
Recruited participants followed a hyperlink to Qualtrics, a survey hosting website on 
which the experiment took place. Informed consent was obtained for all participants. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the child or adult condition, and then read the corresponding 
description of the target.  
Then, participants were randomly assigned to either the general or specific context 
condition, as well as to the mind perception or moral perception condition. After reading the 
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target description, participants in the specific context condition were then assigned to one of two 
orders in which they read the two moral vignettes. Participants in the moral agency first order 
condition read about the target acting as a moral agent in the first vignette and then as a moral 
patient in the second; participants in the moral patiency first order condition read about the target 
acting as a moral patient in the first vignette and as a moral agent in the second (Appendix G). 
Participants in the moral perception condition answered the moral perception questions after 
each vignette, while participants in the mind perception condition completed the mind perception 
questions (Mind Scale: Gray et al., 2007) after reading both vignettes. Participants in the general 
context condition did not read about specific behaviors; they provided target ratings (mind 
perception or moral perception) immediately after reading each target description. 
Upon their completion of their respective questionnaires, participants were debriefed and 
dismissed. Throughout the experiment, participants were unable to revisit text passages and 
questionnaires after they had already read or answered them. 
Results 
 The items comprising the agency dimension of the Mind Scale had excellent internal 
consistency (α = .91) as did the items comprising the experience dimensions (α = .87). The two 
moral agency items (perceived moral responsibility and intentionality) were moderately 
correlated (r = .39) and were consequently averaged to create a moral agency score. The 
perceived pain felt by the target was used as a direct measure of moral patiency. 
 According to the TMP prediction, in the general context condition the adult woman 
should be perceived as higher in agency than the child, but their experience scores should not 
differ. Indeed, the woman received high agency scores (M  = 3.84, SD = .77) than the child (M = 
2.84, SD = .76, t(134) = -2.73, p < .001, d = 1.31), while their experience scores did not differ 
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(woman: M = 3.49, SD = .88; child: M = 3.37, SD = .62), t(134) = .90, p = .37, d = -.14. The 
context hypothesis predicted that in the general context condition moral agency and patiency 
ratings would follow this same pattern. Confirming this prediction, the woman received higher 
moral agency ratings (M = 5.87, SD = 1.07) than the child (M = 3.63, SD = 1.10, t(134) = 11.98, 
p < .001, d = 1.06) while their moral patiency scores did not differ (woman: M = 5.72, SD = 
1.28; child: M = 5.54, SD = 1.64), t(134) = .70, p = .49, d = .12 (Figure 6). 
Although we did not hypothesize about a possible order effect, one emerged. As 
compared to participants who first rated the woman, those who first rated the child gave higher 
ratings on all four measures (agency, experience, moral agency, and moral patiency) for both 
targets all ts(134) > 2.40, all ps < .05. To test whether target type moderated any of these order 
effects, factorial ANOVAs were run predicting agency, experience, moral agency, and patiency 
ratings by order type, target type, and an order x target type interaction. No order x target type 
interaction was revealed, all Fs(135) < 3, all ps > .10, indicating that target type did not moderate 
these effects. 
 According to the specific context prediction, the child should be typecast as a moral 
patient in the specific context, resulting in lower moral agency ratings but higher moral patiency 
ratings than the woman target. In contrast to this hypothesis, neither moral agency ratings (child: 
M = 4.61, SD = 1.53; woman: M = 4.57, SD = 1.56), t(334) = .07, p = .91, d = .03), nor moral 
patiency ratings (child: M = 4.40, SD = 1.05; woman: M = 4.33, SD = 1.08), t(334) = .46, p = .57, 
d = .07) differed across target type. The specific context prediction further proposes that if 
targets are perceived to act as a moral agent or patient in one situation, they should be typecast as 
such in future situations. Accordingly, participants should rate the target as lower in moral 
patiency when they have previously read about the target acting as a moral agent. Likewise, 
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participants should rate the target as lower in moral agency when they have previously read 
about the target as a moral patient. The results failed to confirm these hypotheses. Perceived 
moral agency did not differ between the moral agency first (M = 4.59, SD = 1.56) and moral 
patiency first order conditions (M = 4.61, SD = 1.53, t(334) = -.12, p = .91, d = -.01). Perceived 
patiency ratings also failed to differ between the agency first (M = 4.33, SD = 1.08) and patiency 
first order (M = 4.40, SD = 1.05, t(334) =-.55, p = .56, d = -.07) 
According to the context hypothesis, this observed pattern of results should have also 
been observed for agency and experience ratings provided by participants in the specific context 
condition. Supporting our specific context prediction (that the woman would receive higher 
agency ratings than the child), although failing to mirror the moral agency ratings (and failing to 
support the context hypothesis), the woman was seen as having more agency (M = 3.01, SD = 
.82) than the child (M = 2.72, SD = .71, t(334) = 3.45, p < .001, d = .39). Once again perceptions 
of experience did not differ by target type (woman: M = 3.12, SD = .72; child: M = 3.03, SD = 
.67), t(334) = 1.15, p = .25, d = .13. As with agency and experience ratings, neither agency nor 
experience ratings showed order effects, both ts(334) < 1.0 (Figure 7).  
To test whether context moderated the relationship between agency and experience (or 
between moral agency and patiency), generalized linear models were created. For the mind scale, 
agency ratings were regressed on experience ratings and an experience x context interaction. 
Both experience ratings (β = .85, p < .001) predicted agency ratings and the experience x context 
interaction (β = -.05, p < .001) predicted agency ratings. This interaction functioned such that 
agency and experience ratings exhibited a strong correlation in the specific context (r = .76, p < 
.001) than in the general context (r = .62, p < .001) For the moral perception items, moral agency 
ratings were regressed on patiency ratings and a patiency x context interaction. While moral 
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patiency ratings (β = .0.30, p < .001) predicted moral agency ratings, the moral patiency x 
context interaction (β = .008, p = .81) did not, indicating that context did not moderate the 
relationship between these scores. 
Discussion 
In this study, the context hypothesis predicted that the relationship between agency and 
experience ratings would mirror that between moral agency and patiency ratings within each 
context condition. The general context hypothesis (based upon the TMP) predicted that the child 
would receive lower agency and moral agency ratings than the woman, but that their experience 
and patiency ratings would not differ. Indeed, this hypothesis was confirmed. Additionally, while 
an order effect was not predicted, one was observed, such that if participants rated the child first, 
they provided higher agency, experience, moral agency, and patiency ratings for both targets 
than if they rated the woman first. The specific context prediction (based upon the TDM) 
contained two predictions 1) that the child would be typecast as a moral patient, and thus receive 
lower moral agency and agency, and higher patiency and experience, ratings than the woman and 
2) that if participants read about a target acting as a moral agent or patient in one vignette, they 
would typecast the target as such for subsequent vignettes. Each specific context prediction only 
received limited support. In the specific context condition, the child received lower agency 
scores than the woman, but their moral agency, patiency, and experience scores did not differ. 
Furthermore, only an order effect for agency scores was revealed (such that if participants read 
about the target acting agentically first they provided higher agency ratings and lower experience 
ratings, indicating that the target had been typecast as a moral agent). No such order effect was 
observed for moral agency, patiency, or experience scores.  
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 In sum, while the predictions based upon the TMP were confirmed (thus corroborating 
the past experimental work of Gray et al., 2007), the predictions generated by the TDM received 
little support. In fact, one of the two pieces of supporting evidence for the TDM (that the girl 
received lower agency ratings than the woman in the specific context) cannot necessarily be 
attributed to processes unique to the TDM. Participants in both context conditions read the same 
target descriptions and answered the same agency items, while participants in the specific 
context condition additionally read vignettes depicting the targets in moral situations. 
Consequently, the fact that the girl received lower agency ratings in the specific and general 
context may stem from differences between the target descriptions of the two characters (taken 
from Gray et al.’s (2007) paper on the TMP) rather than the effect of reading moral vignettes 
(taken from Gray and Wegner’s (2009) paper supporting the moral typecasting hypothesis and 
TDM). 
This failure to replicate Gray and Wegner’s (2009) findings is particularly surprising 
given the fidelity with which this study replicated the methodology of their original experimental 
work. This study directly used one vignette from their original set of studies, and the second 
vignette was closely modeled after the other vignettes used in these studies. Furthermore while 
target descriptions were taken from Gray et al.’s (2007) study, they closely mirrored those of 
Gray and Wegner (2009). For example, before reading vignettes, participants in the child 
condition of Gray and Wegner’s (2009) simply saw a picture of a child and read that he was 5 
years of age. In our study, participants in this condition read, “Samantha is a five-year-old girl 
who lives with her parent and older sister Jennifer.” Thus, the difference in our methodologies 
alone does not explain the failure to replicate Gray and Wegner’s (2009) results, and suggests 
that moral typecasting may be a more fragile phenomenon than originally suggested. 
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 Finally, while the order effect observed in the general condition was unexpected, it may 
be due to participants’ differential assumptions about the relative development of children and 
adults. We typically assume that adults are more developed than children, both physically and 
mentally. In this way, if participants rate an adult first, and then rate a child, they may feel 
compelled to provide slightly mitigated ratings across the board for the child, based upon the 
assumption that children are less developed. Conversely, if participants read about the child first, 
not only would the child’s ratings be made without reference to the adult (i.e., not be mitigated), 
but participants might also assign augmented ratings to the adult based again on the assumption 
that adults are more developed than children. Although further experimental work would need to 
be conducted to confirm this hypothesis, as a post-hoc explanation it accounts for the fact that 
participants who rated the child first provided higher ratings across the board for both the child 
and the adult. 
General Discussion 
 Over the course of three studies, we investigated how blame attribution, and mind and 
moral perception function. These three phenomena are linked through their consideration of an 
individual’s agency, and similarly relate to a number of other comparable theories (e.g., 
punishment, Carlsmith et al., 2003; social cognition, Fiske et al., 2006; dehumanization, Haslam, 
2006). While we began by examining these processes with regard to an individual with ASD, to 
achieve a stronger experimental manipulation and more stringent test of how these theories 
related to each other, we also considered how they applied to a child and adult woman.  
In Study 1 we hypothesized that a target with ASD would receive mitigated 
intentionality, capacity, and blame judgments. Confirming this hypothesis, we found that a target 
with ASD was perceived to act with less intentionality and capacity (i.e., with less agency) than 
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an NT target, and that these judgments partially mediated reduced blame judgments, 
corroborating Malle et al.’s (2014) path model of blame. Study 2 examined competing 
predictions of how the dimensions of agency and experience (of the TMP), and moral agency 
and patiency (of the TDM) relate to each other, as well as how a target with ASD is perceived 
along these dimensions. According to the context hypothesis, we predicted that the relationship 
between agency and experience ratings would mirror that between moral agency and patiency 
ratings within each context condition (either specific or general). Based upon the TMP, we 
hypothesized that the target with ASD would receive lower agency and experience, and moral 
agency and patiency, ratings in the general context, evidencing dehumanization. While the target 
with ASD was perceived to possess less agency and moral agency in the general context, his 
perceived experience and moral patiency did not differ from the NT target. Based upon the TDM 
(which posits that moral agency and patiency are inversely related), we hypothesized that the 
target with ASD would be typecast as a moral patient and thus receive lower moral agency and 
agency, and higher moral patiency and experience, ratings in the specific context. While we 
again found that a target with ASD was perceived to possess lower levels of moral agency in the 
specific context, he was not perceived to possess different levels of agency, patiency, or 
experience than the NT target. Thus, the TDM hypothesis that moral agency and patiency, and 
agency and experience, ratings would be inversely related was not confirmed. Study 3 was 
designed as a replication of Study 2, with a stronger experimental manipulation of the difference 
between targets, and greater degree of fidelity to the methodologies of the original theories. The 
specific context prediction (that the targets’ moral agency and patiency, and agency and 
experience, scores would be inversely related) again received little support, while the general 
context prediction (that the girl would receive lower agency and moral agency ratings than the 
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woman, but that their experience and moral patiency ratings would not differ) was confirmed.  
In sum, these studies generated considerable empirical support for both Malle et al.’s 
(2014) Path Model of Blame and Gray et al.’s (2007) TMP, while Gray et al.’s (2012) TDM 
failed to receive such support. Across three moral violations in Study 1, intentionality and 
capacity judgments at least partially mediated blame attribution, corroborating Malle et al.’s 
(2014) sequencing of the path model. Predictions concerning the relationship of agency and 
experience, and moral agency and patiency, ratings in the general context were based upon Gray 
et al.’s (2007) TMP. In Study 3, these predictions were fully confirmed, and although they were 
not confirmed in Study 2 (the target with ASD was not perceived to possess less experience or 
moral patiency as predicted), this appeared to be due to fault with our prediction that the stigma 
associated with ASD would lead to dehumanization, operationalized as lower agency and moral 
agency, and lower experience and moral patiency, ratings. Finally, based upon the TDM, we 
predicted that moral agency and patiency, and agency and experience, scores would be inversely 
related in the specific context. This hypothesis received little support, in either Study 2 or Study 
3. 
Autism Spectrum Disorder, Disability Status, and Perceived Agency 
While PBS is intended to prevent the display of PB in the first place, when PB does arise it is 
responded to with deterrence-based disciplinary methods (Carr et al., 2002), which are typically 
used in response to unintentional norm violations (Darley & Pittman, 2004). Rather than simply 
assigning a punishment equal in severity to the norm violation, deterrence-based punishment is 
assigned in order to optimally prevent the display of similar behavior in the future. 
Consequently, the severity of the punishment assigned to individuals with ASD, within the PBS 
framework, is often mitigated as compared to the severity of punishment assigned to NT 
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students, in line with traditional disciplinary methods. Because punishment is positively 
correlated with blame (Darley & Pittman, 2004), this suggests that people with ASD may be 
blamed less when they commit norm violations, but the extant literature on PBS has not yet 
addressed whether this is the case. Study 1 demonstrates that people with ASD are indeed 
blamed less for norm violations than NT individuals, and future theoretical work on PBS should 
address how blame attribution affects the disciplinary methods of this program. Other factors, 
such as perceived intentionality, have been proposed to affect both blame attribution and the type 
of punishment assigned to individuals, thus future studies should additionally study how such 
factors (e.g., perceived control) may underlie both these broader judgments. 
Although these studies answered a number of questions concerning how people with ASD 
are considered within the context of these theories, as well as the competing predictions 
generated by the TMP and TDM, several questions were raised during the experimental process 
that warrant further consideration. First, in Study 1, we hypothesized that reduced intentionality, 
capacity, and blame ratings for a target with ASD would arise when participants were informed 
about the characteristics of this disorder, and then read about situations in which the target 
committed moral violations putatively related to ASD. Unexpectedly, participants provided these 
mitigated ratings even when the target with ASD committed a moral violation putatively 
unrelated to this disorder. Two explanations may account for this finding.  
First, at the start of the Study 1, participants were explicitly informed that individuals 
with ASD might be more prone to display aggressive behaviors and social deficits than NT 
individuals. Immediately after learning this, they read two vignettes in which a target displays 
PB and makes a social faux pas. The salience with which the description of ASD and consequent 
norm violations were linked may have led participants to discern the purpose of the study and 
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engage in socially desirable responding. As a result, participants may have simply assigned less 
blame to the target with ASD for all vignettes because they presumed that the experimenters 
desired them to do so, rather than actually considering whether aspects of ASD impacted the 
target’s actions. 
Second, in Study 1 the target with ASD was perceived to act less agentically than the NT 
target. This effect was replicated in Study 2, with the joint finding that the perceived experience 
and moral patiency of these targets do not differ. Relatedly, Harris and Fiske (2006) have noted 
that people with disabilities are rated low on competency and high on warmth, which translates 
into low agency ratings and high experience ratings on the Mind Scale. Thus, in Studies 1 and 2 
perceptions of a person with ASD mirrored those of people with disabilities more broadly (such 
that these individuals are perceived to possess less agency than nondisabled individuals). 
Reductions of perceived agency have also been noted to stem from consideration of a person 
with regard to a DSM diagnosis (within which ASD is classified; Gambrill, 2014), or with regard 
to medical settings more broadly (e.g., hospitals and doctor-patient interactions; Haque & Waytz, 
2012). Thus, a substantial base of literature demonstrates that the fact that a person is perceived 
to be disabled (regardless of their disability) may be sufficient to reduce their perceived agency. 
One must then ask what factors drove the mitigated perceived agency of the target with ASD 
observed in Studies 1 and 2. While it is possible that participants directly considered how 
characteristics of ASD influenced the target’s intentionality capacity, it is also possible that the 
target with ASD’s disability status led participants to immediately assume that he possessed less 
agency than the NT target, which manifested as mitigated intentionality and capacity ratings. 
Differentiating the Dimensions of Mind and Moral Perception 
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The results of Studies 2 and 3 call into question whether the dimensions of agency and 
moral agency, and experience and moral patiency, are distinct from one another. To begin, the 
TDM (which proposes the dimensions of moral agency and patiency) draws heavily upon the 
TMP (which proposes the dimensions of agency and experience). Despite these similarities, each 
of these theories posits that their respective dimensions relate differently to each other. The TDM 
states that moral agency and patiency are inversely related to each other, while the TMP states 
that agency and experience are independent of one another. We hypothesized that these different 
proposed relationships stem not from a difference in what each pair of dimensions measures, but 
rather from a difference in the contexts in which these theories consider targets. Specifically, the 
experimental evidence supporting the TMP has asked participants to consider targets in a general 
context, while the experimental evidence supporting the TDM has asked participants to consider 
targets in a specific context. Consequently, we hypothesized that in a general context agency and 
experience, and moral agency and patiency, would relate to each other independently (in line 
with the TMP), and that in the specific context pairs of dimensions would relate inversely to each 
other (in line with the TDM). 
In the current studies, only the hypotheses based upon the TMP were confirmed. In Study 
3, our hypothesis that in a general context participants would perceive that a girl possesses less 
agency and moral agency than a woman, but that these targets would not differ in perceived 
experience and moral patiency, was confirmed. While our hypothesis that a target with ASD 
would receive lower agency and experience, and moral agency and patiency, ratings was not 
confirmed in Study 2, this was likely due to our overestimation of the strength of stigma related 
to ASD. In line with the moral typecasting hypothesis of the TDM, we predicted that targets’ 
moral agency and patiency scores would be inversely related in a specific context, as would their 
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agency and experience scores. Yet, this inverse relationship was not observed in either Study 2 
or 3. Furthermore, the relationship between moral agency and patiency, and agency and 
experience, ratings were very similar to each other in both context conditions of both Studies 2 
and 3. Thus, while these studies generated further empirical support for the TMP, several aspects 
of the TDM –specifically, the moral typecasting hypothesis and the validity of the dimensions of 
moral agency and patiency– are called into question. 
The Moral Typecasting Hypothesis 
Of course, the present lack of evidence supporting the moral typecasting hypothesis does 
not allow one to conclude that this phenomenon is spurious: while we have two studies that fail 
to support the predictions generated by this hypothesis, Gray and Wegner (2009) conducted 
seven studies that revealed a variety of experimental evidence supporting this theory. 
Nonetheless, several theoretical questions are raised by the disagreement with the present results 
and Gray and Wegner’s (2009) data. First, one must note that the moral typecasting hypothesis is 
actually composed of two distinct hypotheses. According to the first, an individual is typecast 
based upon their general traits (e.g., perceptions that a child possesses less self-control and lower 
foresight typecasts them as a moral patient); according to the second, moral typecasting order 
effects can arise, such that an individual can be typecast by their actions in one moral situation 
for future moral situations (e.g., if a person acts as a moral agent in one situation, they will be 
typecast as a moral agent in future situations).  
In Study 3, we found no evidence of these order effects. All participants read two moral 
vignettes depicting the target as either a moral agent (i.e., the target pushes glasses off a table, 
which shatter and cut a man’s leg) or moral patient (i.e., the target is pushed to the ground by a 
woman in a crowd). Half of participants read about the target as moral agent first while the other 
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half read about her as a moral patient first. According to the moral typecasting hypothesis, 
participants who read about her as a moral agent first should have typecast her as such, and 
consequently provided mitigated moral patiency ratings in the following vignette; participants 
who read about her as a moral patient first should have also typecast her as such, and 
consequently provided mitigated moral agency ratings in the following vignette. For example, 
this hypothesis predicts that if participants read about a woman getting pushed down at random 
in a crowd, they will typecast her as a moral patient and thus perceive that she acts with 
mitigated moral agency in subsequent moral situations. Neither of these predicted order effects 
were observed, but this may be due to the strength of the experimental manipulation. 
Specifically, the moral action depicted may need to be severe enough to allow participants to 
infer the target’s fundamental moral character in order for such order effects to arise. 
A further consideration of the Gray and Wegner’s (2009) methodology sheds light on 
both the present failure to observe moral typecasting order effects as well as potential factors that 
may drive these order effects, if they indeed exist. First, although these authors conducted 
numerous studies, only one study was dedicated to demonstrating moral typecasting order 
effects. In this study, a target was described as sitting in a board meeting and either 1) taking the 
lead on a project to increase company profits at the expense of increased polluting or 2) walking 
out of the meeting due to his moral disagreement with such a plan. Gray and Wegner (2009) 
found if participants read about the target committing either of these agentic actions, they 
provided mitigated perceptions of the target’s patiency. Importantly, each of these actions 
communicate a great deal about the target’s moral character: the target’s decision to support or 
oppose this plan to harm the environment in exchange for increased for profits holds great moral 
weight and will likely lead to significant repercussions, for both the target himself as well as the 
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civilians who would be affected by increased pollution. Thus, it is likely that an individual would 
not make this decision impulsively, and that his decision would reflect his underlying moral 
character. As a result, participants may have perceived that the target’s actions in this situation 
were indicative of his fundamental moral character, and based upon this knowledge made other 
inferences about his moral character. For example, individuals may assume that people who are 
willing to stand by their convictions despite opposition (be it backlash from board members or 
public opinion) are less affected by aversive stimuli (be it public opposition or physical pain). In 
this way, the target’s actions in this vignette may have revealed enough about his moral character 
that participants were able to typecast him as a moral agent, and in turn provide mitigated 
perceptions of his moral patiency.  
In contrast to this, learning of a target pushing glasses off a table or being pushed down in 
a crowd –as participants read in this study– provides much less information about the target’s 
moral character. For example, pushing a tray of glasses of a table is a relatively minor moral 
violation, and may be judged as an impulsive action, rather than reflective of the target’s moral 
character, by participants. Thus, if moral actions indeed lead to typecasting by allowing people to 
infer an individual’s fundamental moral character, one would not expect to observe a typecasting 
effect in response to these vignettes.  
Returning to a comparison of the TMP and TDM more broadly, it remains unclear 
whether the dimensions of agency and moral agency, and experience and moral patiency, are 
unique from each other. At the level of operationalization, the dimensions of moral agency and 
patiency are subsumed within the broader dimensions of dimensions of agency and experience. 
Gray and Wegner (2009) operationalize moral agency as perceived intentionality and moral 
responsibility, which roughly map onto the “planning” and “morality” components of the seven-
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item agency dimension of the Mind Scale. Patiency is operationalized simply as one’s capacity 
to experience pain or pleasure, both of which are present on the 11-item experience dimension of 
the Mind Scale. Disregarding minor operational differences in the measures used for these 
dimensions, the measures used for moral agency and moral patiency are almost entirely 
subsumed by the measures used for agency and experience. 
The only novel evidence that Gray et al. (2012) present to support their claim that the 
dimensions of moral agency and patiency relate to each other differently than the dimensions of 
agency and experience stems from the experimental work of Gray and Wegner (2009) on moral 
typecasting. This evidence, though, has been called into question by the present studies. 
Furthermore, when the authors cite past literature in support of the TDM, they typically apply 
their theory post hoc to past experimental findings. Thus, while their theory appears to explain 
the findings of several studies, it cannot be confirmed as the only explanation. For example, 
victims are more likely to engage in blameworthy behavior than individuals who have not been 
victimized (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2012). Gray et al. (2012) posit that this is due to 
victim’s belief that their behavior will be perceived as less blameworthy because they have been 
typecast as moral patients. It is equally possible, though, that victims are simply enraged by their 
situation and choose “act out,” or even that they feel entitled to commit blameworthy behavior 
based upon their victimization. While the moral typecasting hypothesis may explain the results 
of Zitek et al.’s (2012) study, so do a number of other explanations.  
Finally, one must also address paradoxical situations that arise for the TDM, such as the 
victim-blaming that often occurs with rape victim/survivors. Because rape victim/survivors 
experience tremendous trauma, the TDM predicts that they would be typecast as moral patients, 
thus reducing their perceived levels of moral agency. Yet, we see that, contrary to this prediction, 
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rape victims are often blamed for their assault (see meta-analysis by Suarez & Gadalla, 2010). 
Gray et al. (2012) write off such evidence as invalid. They argue that studies demonstrating this 
victim-blaming phenomenon lead participants to feel “complicit” in the violence taking place, 
which then leads participants to engage victim blaming as a way to justify their own immoral 
behavior and alleviate their guilt (see: the Lerner paradigm; Cialdini, Kendrick, & Hoerig, 1976). 
This is most often not the case. For example, Bieneck and Krahé (2011), who recently further 
validated the victim blaming effect, collected their data by administering surveys to a college 
psychology class –students had no reason to believe that their responses would in any way 
contribute to the suffering of an actual person. Thus, nothing about the experimental design 
should have led participants to feel complicit in the fictitious rapes presented. Despite this lack of 
complicity, we see that rape victims are still being blamed for their situations, contrary to the 
prediction of the TDM. 
Future Directions 
  The results of these studies have generated a number of new research questions and 
avenues for future research. First, the target with ASD was perceived to act with less 
intentionality and capacity, and was attributed less blame, than the NT target even when the 
moral violation was putatively unrelated to the characteristics of ASD. Two possible 
explanations may account for this: 1) that participants were engaging in socially desirable 
responding and 2) that participants perceived that the target with ASD possessed less agency 
based on his disability status, rather than the based upon a consideration of how the 
characteristics of ASD actually affected his actions. Both of these factors can be controlled for 
by modifying the experimental design so that participants only learn that the target has ASD, 
without learning about any of the characteristics of the disorder. This modification should reduce 
PERCEPTIONS OF BLAME, MIND, AND MORAL ABILITIES 
 
60 
the salient link between the characteristics of ASD and moral violations committed. 
Consequently, if participants were engaging in socially desirable responding, the perceived 
agency of the target with ASD and NT target should no longer differ, as the salient link between 
the target description and moral violations has been eliminated. If participants perceived that the 
target with ASD possessed mitigated agency based upon his disability status alone, then this 
target should continue to receive mitigated agency ratings with this modification.  
Future studies can additionally examine how disability status affects agency perceptions 
more broadly. While Harris and Fiske (2006) suggest that any disability status leads to mitigated 
perceived agency (or competence), Study 1 calls this into question. Specifically, T1D is also a 
disability –such that it can cause significant impairments to daily functioning– yet the target with 
ASD was still perceived to act with less intentionality and capacity, and receive less blame, in all 
vignettes than the target with T1D. One must then ask whether the type of disability that one 
possesses moderates the effect that one’s disability status has on their perceived agency. 
Specifically, do mental disabilities affect perceived agency differently than physical disabilities?  
Agency is founded in mental processes (principally intentionality and forethought; 
Bandura, 2001), while physical action is a way of enacting agentic desire. In this way, mental 
disabilities may be perceived to influence an individual’s fundamental capacity to be agentic, 
whereas physical disabilities may be perceived to only inhibit certain forms of agentic action. 
For example, if individuals learn that a person with ASD acts with mitigated intentionality in 
certain situations, they may generalize this recognition so that they perceive that a person with 
ASD has a lesser overall capacity to act intentionally, and in turn lesser capacity to act 
agentically. In contrast to this, T1D does not affect a person’s mental faculties, nor does it even 
affect their ability to enact agentic desire through physical actions, and thus one would not 
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expect individuals to perceive that a person with T1D possesses mitigated agency. To further 
assess how physical disabilities may affect perceived agency, one can consider a woman who has 
lost control of both of her legs. This woman still possesses the same mental faculties to develop 
agentic desire as an NT individual, but she has a reduced capacity to execute certain desires. 
While she cannot simply will herself to walk, she can still engage in a variety of other forms of 
agentic action (e.g., writing a letter, planning a vacation, or using a wheelchair to get from one 
place to another). Thus, physical disabilities appear to restrict agentic action in a limited and 
identifiable way, whereas mental disabilities may be perceived to affect a person’s fundamental 
capacity to develop agentic thoughts and desires. Future studies should assess whether this is 
indeed the case, and further tease apart the nuanced ways in which one’s disability status may 
affect their perceived agency. 
To better understand how typecasting order effects function, future studies should 
manipulate the severity of the moral action. If typecasting order effects only arise when 
participants perceive that a moral action is indicative of a target’s fundamental moral character, 
then order effects should become more pronounced as the severity of the action is increased.  
Furthermore, future studies can directly address whether perceptions that an action is indicative 
of a target’s moral character mediates order effects. By asking participants the extent to which 
they believe each action is in line with the target’s moral character, researches can test whether 
this belief moderates the presence and/or strength of order effects.  
Finally, further studies need to be conducted to determine whether the dimensions of 
moral agency and patiency are indeed unique from the dimensions of agency and experience; 
specifically, whether the dimensions of moral agency and patiency indeed relate differently to 
each other than the dimensions of agency and experience. The only experimental evidence 
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supporting the proposed inverse relationship between moral agency and patiency stems from 
Gray and Wegner’s (2009) study, yet results of the present studies contradict this evidence. Thus, 
future studies must begin by continuing to test the predictions generated by the TMP and the 
TDM with a variety of target types and moral violations in order to generate a larger base of 
experimental evidence. If these dimensional pairs are determined to be unique, and the 
hypothesized relationship between the dimensions of each pair (i.e., that the pairs are either 
independently or inversely related) is observed, future studies should also test whether the 
context moderates these relationships. 
Several prominent theories of social perception and regulation (e.g., punishment: Darley 
& Pittman, 2003; social cognition: Fiske et al., 2006; mind perception: Gray et al., 2007; moral 
perception; Gray et al., 2012; dehumanization: Haslam, 2006; blame: Malle et al., 2014) overlap 
in their consideration of a person’s agency, including the extent to which an individual displays 
self-control, planning, forethought, and intentionality. Yet, agency is hypothesized to operate 
slightly different within each of these theories. For example, while the TMP categorizes all 
aspects of agentic action on their agency dimension, Haslam’s (2006) model of dehumanization 
includes perceived agency as a component of his HN dimension while self-control is a 
component of his HU dimension. Fiske et al.’s (2006) model of social cognition includes 
perceived intent along their warmth dimension, while perceived skill, ability, and efficacy are 
listed along their competence dimension. Furthermore, the TMP and TDM each propose a 
different relationship between their respective dimensions of agency and experience. Thus, while 
the literature has outlined what factors comprise agency (e.g., Bandura, 2001), it remains unclear 
exactly how perceived agency affects social perception. It is particularly perplexing that the 
components of agentic action are split unevenly between the parallel dimensions of several 
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theories of social perception. To obtain a more complete understanding of how perceived agency 
affects social perception, future studies should reexamine these theories with a specific focus on 
how agency –and the components that comprise agentic action– function. Future studies should 
also more directly interrogate the differences between current, dual-dimensional theories of 
social perception in order to determine whether they are indeed parallel theories measuring 
unique phenomena, or if they are rather only nominally different.  
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Figure 1. Mean blame, perceived intentionality, and perceived capacity ratings provided by 
participants in the ASD and T1D conditions for the social norm violation vignette. All 
differences were significant at p < .001. 
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Figure 2. Mean blame, perceived intentionality, and perceived capacity ratings provided by 
participants in the ASD and T1D conditions for the problem behavior vignette. All differences 
were significant at p < .001. 
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Figure 3. Mean blame, perceived intentionality, and perceived capacity ratings provided by 
participants in the ASD and T1D conditions for the control vignette. All differences were 
significant at p < .001. 
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Figure 4. Mind and moral perception by target type in the general context condition 
(Study 2) 
*Differences significant at p < .01 
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Figure 5. Mind and moral perception by target type in the specific context condition 
(Study 2) 
*Difference significant at p = .01 
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Figure 6. Mind and moral perception by target type in the general context condition 
(Study 3) 
*Differences significant at p < .001 
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Figure 7. Mind and moral perception by target type in the specific context condition 
(Study 3) 
*Difference significant at p < .001 
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Appendix A 
Neurotypical target: 
Tim is a student in seventh grade. He’s pretty happy with all of his classes, and although 
he doesn’t care too much for English, he loves science, and learning about the world around him. 
He tries to do one extracurricular activity each quarter in addition to school, and he currently 
plays soccer. During his free time, he loves playing video games, reading books, and going on 
walks with his dog. 
Tim also has Type 1 diabetes (T1D), which is an autoimmune disease that he was born 
with. T1D causes the body to destroy the cells that produce insulin, which is a hormone that 
enables people to get energy from food. Because there is no cure for T1D, individuals must 
monitor their blood glucose levels throughout the day, and give themselves insulin injections as 
needed to keep their levels in check. Despite this monitoring, people’s glucose levels can still 
become too low or too high, which is life threatening. Over time, the disease can also have 
serious side effects, such as kidney failure, blindness heart attack, and stroke. 
 
Target with ASD: 
Tim is a student in seventh grade. He’s pretty happy with all of his classes, and although 
he doesn’t care too much for English, he loves science, and learning about the world around him. 
He tries to do one extracurricular activity each quarter in addition to school, and he currently 
plays soccer. During his free time, he loves playing video games, reading books, and going on 
walks with his dog. 
 Tim also has autism spectrum disorder (ASD), a disorder that affects people in two main 
ways. First, individuals with ASD may be more dependent on routines, sensitive to change, and 
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have more repetitive behaviors or interests than typically developing people. This sometimes 
leads them to display aggressive or destructive behaviors when they become frustrated or angry. 
Second, individuals with ASD may have social deficits, which are often related to problems with 
their “theory of mind”, or the ability to imagine someone else’s point of view or empathize with 
them. As a result of these deficits, individuals with ASD may make social faux pas or say 
something offensive to others.   
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Appendix B 
Social norm violation: 
 Tim and Alice are in the same art class. One day, Alice tells Tim that she entered her best 
painting of the year in the school-wide art competition, and that she really hopes to win the 
competition. Next week, the school announces that someone else won the competition. In art 
class that day, a classmate sitting at Tim and Alice’s table asks Alice if she is sad that she lost the 
competition. Alice had been very quiet all day, but she smiles weakly and tells the classmate that 
she doesn’t mind that she lost. After that, Tim talks about how he had entered the competition 
last year, and even though he didn’t like the piece he entered, he still won. When she hears this, 
Alice starts crying and leaves the classroom. 
Problem behavior: 
 Science is Tim’s favorite class of the day. One day, though, when he arrives at his 
science class he finds the teacher directing students to go to the auditorium. Instead of having 
class, a last minute school-wide assembly has been called. Tim tells the teacher that it is unfair to 
cancel class with no warning, and he refuses to go to the assembly. The teacher tells Tim that he 
must go; otherwise he will receive a detention. After hearing this, Tim becomes upset, and yells 
at the teacher, saying that she is being mean. Then, he pushes over a desk and leaves the room. 
Non-ASD related norm violation 
 Tim and Cory are both defenders on the soccer team at school. Last year, Tim had been 
one of the best defenders on the team, and he played every game, but Cory practiced every day 
over the summer, and he improved so much that this year the coach has started putting him in 
instead of Tim. As the season goes on, Tim becomes increasingly frustrated at having to sit on 
the bench while Cory plays, so he makes a plan to get more playing time. All players must wear 
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cleats, shin guards, and their team uniform in order to play, so Tim decides to hide all of Cory’s 
gear before the next game. On the day of the game, Tim moves Cory’s gear to a different locker. 
As a result, Cory is benched and Tim gets to play the entire game. 
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Appendix C 
Social norm violation questions: 
1) How much blame does Tim deserve for hurting Alice’s feelings? 
a. 1 (No blame at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (A great deal of blame) 
2) Did Tim intentionally hurt Alice’s feelings? 
a. 1 (Not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Very much so) 
3) Did Tim know that what he said was going to hurt Alice’s feelings? 
a. 1 (No, definitely not) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Yes, definitely) 
Problem behavior questions: 
1) How much blame does Tim deserve for misbehaving? 
a. 1 (No blame at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (A great deal of blame) 
2) Did Tim intentionally misbehave? 
a. 1 (Not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Very much so) 
3) Was Tim in control of his behavior? 
a. 1 (Not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Very much so) 
Non-ASD related norm violation 
1) How much blame does Tim deserve for misbehaving? 
a. 1 (No blame at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (A great deal of blame) 
2) Did Tim intentionally misbehave? 
a. 1 (Not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Very much so) 
3) Was Tim in control of his behavior? 
a. 1 (Not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Very much so) 
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Appendix D 
Dehumanization questionnaire: 
All questions were answered on the following likert scale: 1 (Not at all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Very much 
so) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?  
1) Tim is broad-minded [HU] 
2) Tim is fun-loving [HN] 
3) Tim is impatient [HN] 
4) Tim is thorough [HU 
5) Tim is disorganized [HU] 
6) Tim is shy [HN] 
7) Tim is active [HN] 
8) Tim is stingy [HU] 
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Appendix E 
Mind Scale Questionnaire (Gray et al., 2007): 
Now, we would like your impressions of Tim. You will be asked to rate whether Tim possesses a 
variety of traits, by comparison to the average person. Please give us your immediate impression 
and be as honest as possible. All questions were answered on the following likert scale: 1 (not at 
all) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very much so) 
 
Agency  
1. Self-control 
2. Morality 
3. Emotion Recognition 
4. Memory 
5. Planning 
6. Communication 
7. Thought 
 
Experience 
1. Hunger 
2. Fear 
3. Pain 
4. Pleasure 
5. Rage 
6. Desire 
7. Personality 
8. Consciousness 
9. Pride 
10. Embarrassment 
11. Joy 
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Appendix F 
Moral Questionnaire 
Now, we would like your impressions of Tim. Please consider Tim in comparison to the average 
person while answering the following questions.  
 
Compared to the average person, to what extent can Tim… 
1) Be fully morally responsible for his actions 
a. 1 (much less so) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (much more so) 
2) Deserve blame for acting negatively? 
a. 1 (much less so) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (much more so) 
3) Deserve praise for acting positively? 
a. 1 (much less so) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (much more so) 
4) Experience suffering caused by another person 
a. 1 (much less so) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (much more so) 
5) Experience pleasure caused by another person 
a. 1 (much less so) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (much more so) 
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Appendix G 
Order 1: 
1. Imagine that Sharon/Samantha is out to lunch. She pushes a tray of glasses off a table. 
They shatter and one of the shards cuts the man, Roger, sitting next to her. 
2. Imagine that a woman, Tasha, is in a rush. She pushes through a crowd and knocks over a 
Sharon/Samantha, who falls and scrapes her knee. 
 
Order 2: 
1. Imagine that a woman, Tasha, is in a rush. She pushes through a crowd and knocks over a 
Sharon/Samantha, who falls and scrapes her knee. 
2. Imagine that Sharon/Samantha is out to lunch. She pushes a tray of glasses off a table. 
They shatter and one of the shards cuts the man, Roger, sitting next to her. 
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Appendix H 
Moral Questionnaire (Specific) 
Now, we would like your impressions of what happened. 
For every vignette, the first two questions inquire about the person who was portrayed as a 
moral agent (Person 1), while the third question inquires about the person who was portrayed as 
the moral patient (Person 2). 
 
a. How responsible is Person 1 for her behavior? 
b. How intentional was Person 1’s behavior? 
c. How much pain does Person 2 feel when she scrapes her knee? 
 
 
 
Moral Questionnaire (General) 
Now, we would like your impressions of Sharon/Samantha. Please consider Sharon/Samantha in 
comparison to the average person while answering the following questions.  
 
Compared to the average person, to what extent can Sharon/Samantha… 
6) Be responsible for her actions 
a. 1 (much less so) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (much more so) 
7) Act intentionally? 
a. 1 (much less so) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (much more so) 
8) Experience pain caused by another person 
a. 1 (much less so) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (much more so) 
 
